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COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCE EXPOSURE

J.

DAVID PRINCEt

Hazardous wastes, threatening environmental and human safety, are
being generated at an alarming rate. In this Article, J. David Prince
discusses the threats posed by hazardous wastes and the remedies that
are available in Minnesota for dealing with those threats. Professor
Prince analyzes a proposed compensation scheme for victims of hazardous waste exposure in Minnesota and suggests that a modification
of that scheme be adopted by the Minnesota Legislature.
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INTRODUCTION

Contact with hazardous wastes, the pernicious product of industrialization, has become almost inescapable. Approximately 750,000 hazardous waste generators in the United
States produce nearly 150 million tons of hazardous by-products annually} In Minnesota alone, nearly 2000 hazardous
1. See Office of Public Awareness, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Hazardous Waste-Fifteen Years and Still Counting 2 (OPA 98) (1980); 14 ENV'T REP.
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waste generators operate to produce approximately 174,000
tons of hazardous waste per year. 2 It is estimated that, nationally, ninety percent of hazardous waste has been handled in a
manner which threatens human health and the environment. 3
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) figures show that approximately 1.2 million Americans are currently exposed to·
health hazards. 4
On May 10, 1983, in response to the increasing incidence of
environmental contamination by hazardous substances, Governor Rudy Perpich signed the Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act (MERLA).5 This Act established a
standard of strict and joint and several liability for the release6
of hazardous substances. 7 It also established a fund to provide
(BNA) 715 (1983) (EPA Study says four times more waste generated annually than
previously thought).
2. Minnesota Waste Management Board, Hazardous Waste Management Report IV-8, IV-14 (Dec. 1983) [hereinafter cited as WMR]. Approximately 45,000 tons
of this amount (25.9%) has not been accounted for by hazardous waste management
authorities. Id. at V-29. The Board estimates that 232,800 tons of waste will be generated in Minnesota in the year 2000. Id. at IV-27.
3. See Hazardous Waste Management System: Identification and Listing of Hazardous Waste, 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084 (1980).
4. See SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PuBLIC WORKS, INJURIES AND DAMAGES FROM HAZARDOUS WASTE-ANALYSIS AND IMPROVEMENT OF LEGAL REMEDIES, S.
REP. No. 97-12, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pts. I, 32 (1982) [hereinafter cited as 301(e)
REPORT] (emphasizing that estimate of 1.2 million Americans does not include latent
injuries or future claims).
5. Environmental Response and Liability Act, ch. 121, 1983 Minn. Laws 310
(codified at MINN. STAT. ch. 115B (1984».
6. MERLA defines "release" as.follows:
"Release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emlttmg,
emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing
into the environment which occurred at a point in time or which continues
to occur.
"Release" does not include:
(a) Emissions from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock,
aircraft, watercraft, or pipeline pumping station engine;
(b) Release of source, byproduct, or special nuclear material from a nuclear incident, as those terms are defined in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
under 42 United States Code section 2014, if the release is subject to requirements with respect to financial protection established by the Federal
Nuclear Regulatory Commission under 42 United States Code section 2210;
(c) Release of source, byproduct or special nuclear material from any
processing site designated pursuant to the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation
Control Act of 1978, under 42 United States Code section 7912(a)(l) or
7942(a); or
(d) Any release resulting from the application of fertilizer or agricultural or silvicultural chemicals, or disposal of emptied pesticide containers
or residues from a pesticide as defined in section 18A.21, subdivision 25.
MINN. STAT. § 115B.02, subd. 15.
7. MERLA defines "hazardous substance" as follows:
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for the cleanup of contaminated hazardous waste sites m
Minnesota. 8
In addition to MERLA's statutory strict liability remedy, victims of hazardous substance releases in Minnesota may also
choose from a variety of existing remedies. These remedies
include the traditional tort law theories of liability and damages, workers' compensation, and private health and disability
insurance plans.
(a) Any commercial chemical designated pursuant to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, under 33 United States Code section 1321(b)(2)(A);
(b) Any hazardous air pollutant listed pursuant to the Clean Air Act,
under 42 United States Code section 7412; and
(c) Any hazardous waste.
"Hazardous substance" does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, synthetic gas usable for fuel, or mixtures of such
synthetic gas and natural gas, nor does it include petroleum, including
crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise a hazardous waste.
/d., subd. 8.
"Hazardous waste" is defined as follows:
(a) Any hazardous waste as defined in section 116.06, subdivision 13,
and any substance identified as a hazardous waste pursuant to rules adopted
by the agency under section 116.07; and
(b) Any hazardous waste as defined in the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, under 42 United States Code section 6903, which is listed or
has the characteristics identified under 42 United States Code section 6921,
not including any hazardous waste the regulation of which has been suspended by act of Congress.
Id., subd. 9.
8. Id. §§ 115B.19-20. The Act required a legislative study regarding a victim
compensation fund to compensate individuals injured by hazardous substances and
not otherwise compensated.
By July 1, 1984, the Legislative Commission on Waste Management
shall conduct a study and make recommendations to the legislature on the
creation of a compensation fund to compensate persons who are injured as
the result of a release of a hazardous substance and who would not otherwise be adequately compensated for their injuries. The study shall consider
matters including the following:
(a) The appropriate scope of compensation which should be provided
by the fund including the extent of any compensation which should be available for medical expenses, disability, loss of income, physical impairment,
and death;
(b) Creation of a simple, speedy, and cost efficient claims procedure
which provides an effective remedy for injured claimants;
(c) Methods by which compensation can be financed by those who create or contribute to the risk of injury from hazardous substance releases,
including the manner by which the state may seek to recover amounts paid
from the fund; and
(d) Whether the fund should be established and administered at the
federal or state level and the appropriate degree of state and federal cooperation in providing compensation.
1983 Minn. Laws 341 (not codified in Minnesota Statutes). For a discussion of the
study done pursuant to this legislative directive, see infra notes 301-27 and accompanying text.
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While MERLA and other existing remedies provide some relief for victims of hazardous substance exposure, these remedies fall short of providing expedient, cost-efficient recovery of
damages in all situations. Present laws and compensation
mechanisms are simply inadequate to remedy all personal injuries caused by hazardous substances. Accordingly, these common law and statutory remedies must be supplemented by a
no-fault administrative scheme to ensure adequate compensation to those injured by hazardous substance exposure.
Part I of this Article considers the evidence that personal injuries have been or are being caused by human exposure to
hazardous substances and assesses the scope of the problem.
Much of this discussion also concerns the problem of proving
that a particular injury was caused by hazardous substance exposure. Part II explores whether existing systems of compensation, such as the tort law system and health insurance,
adequately compensate these victims. Much of the discussion
in this area analyzes the present tort law system: the plaintiffs
burden of proof regarding causation of injury, the cost of litigation and, where new liability standards are established, questions of retroactive liability and the imposition of joint and
several liability against defendants. This part also addresses
the statutory remedy in MERLA designed to solve problems
faced in traditional tort law actions by persons injured as a result of exposure to hazardous substances. Finally, Part III
briefly discusses the alternative compensation system described in the study recently done by the Legislative Commission on Waste Management (LCWM) for the Minnesota
Legislature.
I.

EVIDENCE OF INJURY AND THE NEED FOR COMPENSATION

An estimation of the number of victims9 of hazardous sub9. The tenn "victim" is more difficult to define than hazardous substance. It
generally does not include workplace or consumer product-related injuries, nor injuries due purely to emotional distress with no associated physical injury. In one sense
anyone who feels less safe in their environment is a victim of hazardous substances.
Even if there is no actual threat, the perceived risk is a serious matter which diminishes the erlioyment of life. ·However, compensation to the general populace to alter
widespread feelings of insecurity is simply not feasible.
Physical injuries and monetary losses provide an alternative method for identifying victims of hazardous substances. These losses can be more easily quantified than
those suffered by individuals who feel insecure in their environment. Individuals
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stance lO exposure would be considerably easier if adequate
data sources on such injuries were available. Unfortunately,
public health reporting agencies have not generated comprehensive statistics of human injury from hazardous substances.
The creation of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR) under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) II is the first step at the national level toward collecting
with quantifiable personal injuries or property losses who do not receive adequate
compensation for their losses constitute a more readily definable group of victims.
Other difficulties surround the identification of victims. For example, a person
could be injured because of the combined reaction between a hazardous substance
and something in his lifestyle, such as smoking. Some hazardous substances only
increase the probability of an injury and it is sometimes impossible to trace a particular injury back to an exposure to a hazardous substance. See Trauberman, Statutory
Reform of "Toxic Torts ": Relieving Legal, Scientific, and Economic Burdens on the Chemical
Victim, 7 HARV. ENVrL. L. REV. 177, 181 & n.15 (1983) (citing Epstein, The Role of the
Scientist in Toxic Tort Case Preparation, TRIAL, July 1981, at 38).

Usually those who face an increased risk of future injury, but no actual injury, as
a result of hazardous substance exposure are not considered victims. With certain
exceptions, employees injured at work are excluded because MERLA provides that
there is no liability for injury to an employee for workplace exposure if the workers'
compensation statute provides compensation. MINN. STAT. § 115B.05, subd. 3.
10. MERLA defines "hazardous substance", in part, by reference to categories of
chemicals which are designated by federal or state officials as hazardous. MINN. STAT.
§ 115B.02, subd. 8; see supra note 7 (definition of hazardous substance). Thus, the
number of substances which are classified as hazardous is quite large, and several
documents and regulations itemize the hazardous substances and the processes that
produce them. See, e.g., EPA Designation of Hazardous Substances, 40 C.F.R.
§ 116.4 (1984).
A number of substances which may endanger human health and the environment are excluded from coverage under MERLA. MERLA specifically excludes natural gas and synthetic gas usable as fuel, and excludes petroleum and petroleum
fractions if the substances are not in waste form. Waste petroleum, however, is considered a hazardous substance. MINN. STAT. § 115B.02, subd. 8. Nuclear source,
special nuclear, or nuclear by-product materials, as defined by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, are not defined as hazardous substances by MERLA. Releases of such
materials are also explicitly excluded from the definition of releases of hazardous
substances. Id., subd. 15(b).
Other substances which seem dangerous are not defined as hazardous if they
reach the environment by "acceptable" methods. For example, the application of
fertilizer, agricultural, or silvicultural chemicals and related disposal of empty pesticide containers or residues is not considered the "release" of hazardous substances.
/d., subd. 15(d). If, however, such chemicals are spilled during manufacture or transport, or if the intent is to dispose of the chemical itself rather than an empty
container with some residue, this would be the "release" of hazardous substances.
The emission of chemicals that would normally be defined as hazardous, but that are
released in consumer use or as the result of exhaust emissions, are not defined as
hazardous. Id., subd. 15(a).
11. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
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pertinent information on the health effects of hazardous
substances.
In Minnesota, no readily available data estimates the number
of people who have been or may be injured by hazardous substances. The State Health Department does not gather health
statistics on illness resulting from hazardous waste exposure
and no other state agency is responsible for gathering this type
of data. 12 There is data, however, on potential exposure.
A.

Current Data on Potential Exposure

One source of information often seen as a basis for estimation is the data on existing hazardous waste sites. Minnesota
has a large number of contaminated hazardous waste sites. In
1981, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA) listed
thirty-six such sites. In 1982, the list grew to forty-five and by
early 1985 the list stood at the current total of eighty-seven. I!!
Approximately thirty-five more hazardous waste sites have
been discovered and should be added to this list within the
next two years. 14 The MPCA's eighty-seven hazardous waste
sites contain a variety of hazardous substances including PCB,
PCE, TCE, and PCP, as well as heavy metals, paint sludge, and
solvents. 15 Of the eighty-seven identified hazardous waste
sites currently listed, thirty-four appear on the EPA's National
Priority List (NPL) of 418 sites. Twelve more sites have been
proposed for addition to the NPL.16 As public awareness of
the danger of hazardous wastes continues to grow, more hazardous waste sites may be reported. 17
of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767-2811 (1980) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9657 (1982».
12. Telephone interview with Dave Oray, Minnesota State Health Department
(Apr. 4, 1984).
13. Telephone interview with Gary Pulford, Chief of the Site Response Section
within the Division of Solid and Hazardous Wastes of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (]an. 29, 1985); Gelbach, Toxic Shock-Minnesota s tough new hazardous-waste
law has business down in the dumps, CORP. REP., Sept. 1983, at 64, 69.
14. Telephone interview with Gary Pulford, Chief of the Site Response Section
within the Division of Solid and Hazardous Wastes of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (March 20, 1985).
15. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Log of 87 Hazardous Waste Sites in
Minnesota (]an. 1985) (available at Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Roseville,
Minnesota).
16. WMR, supra note 2, at 111-34.
17. Three hundred potential hazardous waste sites have been identified through
citizen participation in an MPCA program that allows public tips on suspected waste
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In addition to sites which are technically defined as hazardous waste sites, solid waste disposal sites (sanitary landfills) are
also grouped under a different heading by the MPCA. Five of
these sanitary landfills are currently being considered for inclusion on the NPL.IS There are 130 permitted sanitary landfills in Minnesota which are potential hazardous waste sites.
Besides simply listing these sites, MPCA files also contain
specific data on each site. For each hazardous waste site in
Minnesota, the MPCA file describes the site, lists any action
which has been taken on the site to date, and the action which
needs to be taken in the future. The most complete data is
available for those sites which are the most dangerous or are
best known to the public. Data for these sites has been extensively analyzed and includes exposure routes, containment and
waste characteristics, exposure target characteristics, and ob·
served releases or injuries. 19
The data exists only for the sites which are listed on the
NPL. The data was developed to implement a hazard ranking
system (HRS) by which the EPA ranks the danger, to both peo·
pIe and the environment, of various sites around the nation. 20
The necessary data has been compiled for all of the eightyseven hazardous waste sites; data for thirty-four sites revealed
hazards serious enough to be placed on the NPL. None of this
data, however, estimates the potential number of injuries from
sites. WMR, supra note 2, at 1II-35. More than 600 citizen complaints have been
received on a hazardous waste hotline in Minnesota since 1981. Id.
18. Telephone interview with Gary Pulford, Chief of the Site Response Section
within the Division of Solid and Hazardous Wastes of the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (May 30, 1984).
19. Minnesota Pollution Control Agency Files (available at Minnesota Pollution
Control Agency, Roseville, Minnesota).
Data on exposure route characteristics includes the generic route (ground water,
surface water, air, fire and explosion, or direct contact) and environmental characteristics important to each route (e.g. depth to aquifer, soil permeability, net precipitation, surface slope, intervening terrain, nearest surface water, maximum 24 hour
rainfall). Containment characteristics include the natural or artificial means which
have been used to minimize or prevent a contaminant from injuring the environment
(e.g. liners, collection systems, sealed containers, diversion structures). Waste characteristics include toxicity, persistence, quantity, reactivity, incompatibility with other
substances, and ignitability. Target characteristics include types of ground or surface
water use, distance to nearest well, distance to sensitive environment, population
served by ground water or surface water intake within three miles downstream, land
use, number of buildings and population in vicinity of site, and population within two
and four air miles. Id.
20. Id.
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jured parties to their economic position before the injury.
B.

665
In-

Assessing the Scope of the Injuries Problem and Proving Actual
Injury

No accurate assessment of the number of personal injuries
caused by hazardous substance exposure can be made by examining existing data on hazardous waste sites in Minnesota
and combining that data with existing scientific methods of
identifying a causal link between hazardous substances and injury or disease. This point deserves emphasis. It is not a matter of being imprecise; rather, it cannot be done. Even a
general estimate of injury based directly on site data is impossible. The calculation of such an estimate involves many steps
for which little or no crucial data is available. Consequently,
this approach will not lead to supportable estimates. Furthermore, the difficulties in estimating the scope of the whole injury problem also present difficulties of proof in any given case
of injury. Nevertheless, the scope of the whole problem can be
roughly calculated by alternative methods. 21 These alternative
21. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 31-32. The 301(e) Study Group did not
conduct any original research to determine the number of potential injuries resulting
from hazardous substances. Instead it gathered the existing data it could locate on
this issue. The 1980 EPA estimate of 1.2 million Americans currently exposed to
health hazards from hazardous dump sites is mentioned, but the Report emphasized
that the estimate provides no indication of latent injuries and future claims. [d. at 32;
see Leunet, Handling Hazardous Wastes, ENV'T, Oct. 1980, at 7.
A section of the Report discussing the quantification of injury states:
The discussion oflegal issues relating to injuries from hazardous wastes
must proceed in a setting offactual and scientific uncertainty because, at this
time, in mid-1982, it is impossible to determine the number of persons who
have been injured or who could be injured by exposure to such sites.
301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 21 (footnote omitted).
The Report described a general approach for determining the potential number
of hazardous substance exposure victims. Initially, all dump sites would have to be
located and their contents determined. Then the waste sites and surrounding areas
would have to be examined to determine if the possibility of human exposure and
injury existed. Despite the conceptual simplicity of this approach, the Report correctly points out the substantial obstacles to estimating potential victims. It was recognized then, as is true today, that "public identification of a significant problem is at
an early stage." [d., pt. 2, at A-8. See also Grad, Hazardous Waste Victim Compensdion:
The Report of the § 301(e) Superfund Study Group: A Response to Theodore L. Garrett, 13
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,234 (1983). Since the release of the 301(e) Report, no statistical
studies on injuries or major health effects surveys have been published. Telephone
interview with Frank P. Grad, Reporter for the 30 I (e) Study Group (March 19, 1985).
Other studies include the OMB's study to estimate the cost of a hazardous waste
victim compensation program, telephone interview with Robert Wilmore, OMB offi-
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methods are still rather limited in their accuracy because they
are all indirect methods of estimating injury numbers.
1.

HazardotL5 Waste Site Data

The most direct method of injury estimation would be made
directly from data on the exposure of humans to hazardous
waste sites. Unfortunately, this approach cannot currently be
used to provide any reliable estimate of injury simply because
the necessary data is not available. The most complete data on
hazardous waste sites in Minnesota is in the MPCA files compiling the data and HRS scores for all eighty-seven hazardous
waste sites. 22
Even with complete HRS data on a particular site, reliable
conclusions cannot be drawn about the potential number of
injuries resulting from that site. The HRS does not quantify
either the probability or magnitude of harm that could result
from a waste facility. Rather, it ranks facilities in terms of the
potential threat they pose.
The steps necessary to estimate injuries from hazardous substance sites are:
1. The number of sites yet to be discovered or created
must be estimated and added to existing known sites. 23
2. The specific substances in each site must be identified.
cial (May 30, 1984), and the Chemical Manufacturers Association study conducted by
the Universities Associated for Research and Education in Pathology (UAREP). See
TAKING A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, PUBLIC COMPENSATION: THE NEED FOR HEALTH EFFECTS STUDIES (Chemical Manufacturers Association 1983); Telephone conversation
with Gordon Strickland, Deputy Technical Director ofCMA (May 31,1984). Again,
however, these studies do not estimate the number of potential injuries from exposure to hazardous substances.
Although these studies demonstrate that preliminary steps are being taken to
develop accurate information regarding toxic substances health effects and their
scope, they provide little help for the present task of estimating the number of injured parties in Minnesota who are in current need of monetary relief because of
exposure to hazardous substances. The studies also fail to provide information regarding latent injuries and future claims.
22. Telephone interview with Pulford, supra note 13.
23. The MPCA has discovered new sites on a geometrically increasing basis each
year for the past three years. New discoveries will probably taper off in time because
most testing sites will have been discovered, and because increasing regulation and
public awareness will prevent the large-scale creation of new sites. The rate of hazardous waste site discovery will not reach zero (no new discoveries) because industrial activity will accidently or illegally create new sites. Furthermore, most, if not all,
Minnesota landfills contain some concentration of various toxic substances. St. Paul
Pioneer Press, Oct. II, 1983, at 2C, col. 2.
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Even in some existing sites the substances have not been
identified. 24
3. The physical pathways for a substance's movement must
be identified; this path varies with each site. 25
4. The concentrations of substances in these pathways
through time and across geographic areas must be evaluated.
These factors also vary with each site. 26
24. See Seltzer, Personal Injury Hazardous Waste Litigation: A Proposal For Tort Reform,
10 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. REV. 797,819 (1983). At Woburn, Massachusetts, one of the
most celebrated sites in the United States, no study has identified the precise number
and volume of hazardous substances present. Id.
Hazardous substances at many sites are buried in drums. No sampling method
can accurately determine the contents of buried containers. 301 (e) REPORT, supra
note 4, pt. 2, at A-6 (quoting the DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
REPORT ON THE POTENTIAL HEALTH EFFECTS OF TOXIC CHEMICAL DUMPS, reprinted in
SEN. COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PuBLIC WORKS, HEALTH EFFECTS OF TOXIC POLLUTION: A REPORT FROM THE SURGEON GENERAL AND A BRIEF REVIEW OF SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL CONTAMINATION INCIDENTS WITH A POTENTIAL FOR HEALTH EFFECTS, 96TH
CONG., 20 SESS. (Comm. Print 1980) at 27-35). Identification of chemicals at a site is
complicated by the fact that the various sampling techniques available can cause an
unintended release of the hazardous substances being tested. Id. Furthermore,
when different chemicals are combined at one site, the resulting chemical mixtures
may be impossible to identify.
25. Telephone interview with Pulford, supra note 13; Telephone interview with
Michael Kanner, Minnesota Pollution Control Agency Site Response Section-Unit
Supervisor (Nov. I, 1983).
A released hazardous substance follows a variety of pathways to enter the human
body. These substances may be delivered via the atmosphere, food chains, ground
or surface water, or contaminated soil. The prevalent pathway for the eighty-seven
Minnesota hazardous waste sites is through ground or surface water. Id.
Groundwater is the most common pathway for hazardous substances, but effective monitoring of groundwater concentrations is problematic for several reasons.
301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pI. I, at 28-29. There is no general agreement on drilling methods, sampling frequency, standard quality assurance procedures, or the adequate number of wells needed. The risk exists that drilling of monitoring wells could
contaminate clean aquifers. Id. at 29. Chemical concentrations are discoverable, ifat
all, only after continuing samples are taken. Such discovery does not provide much
information regarding the duration and amount of concentrations before sampling
procedures began.
26. See, e.g., FMC Corp. Consents to Response Order for Clean up of Fridley, Minn., Waste
Site, 14 ENV'T. REP. (BNA) 255 (1983).
The FMC site in Fridley is located on the Mississippi River approximately one
quarter mile upstream from the drinking water intake for Minneapolis. The site contains trichloroethylene (TCE), a known human carcinogen. Trace amounts of TCE
have been discovered in the Mississippi River and in Minneapolis drinking water. On
June 8, 1983, FMC agreed to clean up the site by excavating 58,000 cubic yards of
TCE-contaminated soil and placing the soil in an on-site containment facility. Id.
The FMC site is an extreme example of potential exposure from TCE ingestion to an
inordinately large number of Minnesotans from a single hazardous waste site.
Although the FMC site is now being cleaned up according to the specifications of
environmental agencies, the continuing effects of past practices at this site are
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5. Given the concentrations of substances in the pathways,
the durations and amounts of exposures to humans with different behavior patterns and with different levels of mobility must
be examined. 27
6. The durations and amounts of human exposures to potentially interactive environmental influences through time and
across geographic areas must be determined. 28
7. The toxic effects of both the hazardous substances and
the interaction with environmental influences must be evaluated using indeterminate medical tests. 29 The toxic effects
often vary with individual characteristics such as race, age, and
sex.30
The lack of reliable data needed to take many, if not all, of
these steps combine to make reliable estimates of injury from
existing hazardous waste site data impossible. This data deficiency can also make the proof of a given claim very difficult or
impossible. Consequently, other bases for estimating injury
must be considered.
thought to be the source of contamination of the principal drinking water aquifer in
the Twin Cities area. !d. at 256.
27. Cf Trauberman, supra note 9, at 181. Humans in the same location have very
different behavior patterns which expose them differently to the same contaminated
pathway. Different amounts ot contaminated water may be ingested. due to exercise
levels. cooking and eating patterns. or extensive dining away from home. These different behavior patterns create different exposures to different pathways. and the
manner of entry may determine the concentration and manifestation of symptoms.
Ingestion. inhalation, and direct skin contact comprise the methods of exposure to
dangerous chemicals into the body from their environmental pathways. The affected
population itself also changes as individuals move into or out of the contaminated
pathways. ld.
28. Victims ingest different amounts of other interactive foods and chemical
sources. Certain hazardous substances react in combination with these other environmental influences to create a danger that is more serious than either chemical by
itself. See Hoover. Environmental Cancer in PUBLIC CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL
HEALTH HAZARDS 50 (E. Hammond & I. Selikoff eds. 1979) (other sources causing
cancer include exposure to toxic chemicals. radiation. diet. drugs. and personal
habits).
29. Although the health effects of relatively high concentrations of some chemicals are known, usually no causal link can be drawn from data concerning low to
medium concentrations. See. e.g., CHRONIC DISEASES DIVISION AND CLINICAL CHEMISTRY DIVISION. CENTER FOR ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH. CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL.
STUDY PROTOCOL: POLY-CHLORINATED BIPHENYLS (PCBs). EXPOSURE AT SUPERFUND
WASTE SITES 23 Gune 8, 1983).
30. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4. pt. 1. at 31-32. The 30I(e) Study Group noted
that "[t]he scientific problem of estimating the number of victims is so great because
the uncertainties multiply at each step of the process of determining the number of
persons exposed and the causal link between exposure and injury." !d.
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Medical and Scientific Methodologies

There are five basic scientific methods of identifying a causal
link between hazardous substances and injury from disease:
case clusters,31 structural toxicology,32 laboratory study of simple test systems, animal bioassays,33 and epidemiology. The
EPA relies on all of these methods in estimating the danger of
hazardous substances to humans. To some extent, the weaknesses of one method are partially overcome by the strengths
of another method in determining hazardous substance effects.
But the use of these methods is costly and still results in significant uncertainty. The scientific methodologies mentioned
above result at most in a finding of a probability of injury in
humans. Case clusters, structural toxicology, and the study of
simple systems do not provide probabilities which may be used
with confidence. Ultimately, none of these scientific methods
provides absolute evidence of cause and effect except under
extreme exposure conditions. These methods are often inconclusive in tying a substance to a specific injury when exposures
are not extreme in duration or concentration and when there
are unknown combined effects with other unidentified environmental influences. In certain instances, a given chemical will
cause different injuries in different persons, further complicating the task of estimating the total number of persons injured.
When these uncertainties are combined with the problems in
assessing the potential for harm of any given hazardous substance site it is easy to understand why reliable estimation of
total human injuries from hazardous substance exposure is so
problematic. It also adds emphasis to the problem of proving
any particular case.
In order to reliably estimate the total number of injuries, the
hazardous substance concentration levels would have to be determined at each geographic point where, and over all periods
when, exposure might take place. The total number of people
with each relevant set of injury characteristics (consumption
patterns, duration and intensity of exposure, age, exposure to
synergistic agents, and so on) would have to be determined
31. See, e.g., Shear, Seale & Gottlieb, Evidencefor Space-Time Clustering of Lung Cancer Deaths, 35 ARCHIVES OF ENV. HEALTH 335 (1980).
32. See, e.g., RaIl, Threshold7, in ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECTIVES 22, 164-65 (1978).
33. See Seltzer, supra note 24, at 816.
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and then multiplied by the probability of injury for people possessing those characteristics.
Even if the total number of injuries could be estimated, evaluation of the cost of adequate compensation would require
knowledge of how these injuries accrue to different age groups
and different occupations. Any evaluation of the economic
losses to be compensated from loss of earnings and other damages associated with the injury could then be made.
3.

The LCWM Study's Injury Estimate

Until the LCWM Study was done, no other study suggested
possible methods for reliably estimating injuries. The United
States Senate's 301 (e) Report,34 for example, simply concluded that while no one knows the number of injuries, it is
known that there are hazardous waste sites, that people are exposed to chemicals from these sites, and that there must therefore be injuries to be compensated. 35 The LCWM Study used
a number of methods to estimate the number of injuries and
the number of people who are inadequately compensated for
injuries from hazardous substance exposure.
The Study begins with the proposition that those persons in
need of compensation for hazardous substance related injuries
are likely to seek outside help. They may seek the assistance of
a physician, an attorney, family and friends, or even the press.
By surveying the number of contacts made to outside sources
of help, the Study makes a rough estimate of the current
number of injured parties. 36
A number of sources of data upon which an estimate could
be based were considered. Physicians have the best skills for
verifying the injury source, and most injured persons will seek
some medical advice on their condition. 37 Attorneys are also
34. See supra note 21.
35. Id.

36. A direct survey would be extraordinarily time consuming-if the number of
injuries were small the survey sample would need to be unusually large. Even if such
a survey were conducted, the information obtained from the respondents would be
of doubtful quality since injured persons are unlikely to have the expertise to know
the cause of their injuries. The possibility of skewed responses from hypochondriacs
is also quite large.
37. A physician survey might be expected to pick up nearly all injured parties.
Unfortunately, while all people injured by hazardous substances may go to a physician, this does not mean that a physician survey of such patient contacts will lead to
reliable or approximate estimates of numbers injured because the possibility of mis-
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fairly skilled at determining the source of an injury. Attorneys
act as coordinators of medical or engineering evidence, or
other evidence needed to verify that a hazardous substance was
present, that the injured party was exposed to that substance,
and that the exposure caused the injury.38 The press usually
notes the more newsworthy instances of injury claimed to result from hazardous substances exposure, though there is no
guarantee that those claims are accurate.
A physician survey was rejected as impractical primarily because most physicians' diagnoses will not go beyond determining the nature of a patient'S disease or injury and actually
attempt to determine the cause of the injury. Furthermore, the
required sample from a physician survey would be quite large
diagnosis is substantial when hazardous substances are involved. Cj Seltzer, supra
note 24, at 810 (the cause of injury may be a product of multiple contributing factors,
making it virtually impossible to identify the precise cause of the injury).
In addition, while exposure to hazardous wastes causes acute and chronic health
effects, a physician is more likely to see and diagnose the acute effects. "Even after
exposure to medically dangerous levels of contamination, symptoms of disease may
develop slowly and may be difficult to identify in their early stages." Seltzer, supra
note 24, at 811.
The average physician is not trained to diagnose chronic exposures, and chronic
exposures are the greatest concern because they are more numerous than incidences
of acute exposure. Since hazardous substance exposures, and particularly chronic
exposures, are so difficult to diagnose, the accuracy of the data obtained by a physician survey is sufficiently suspect and an estimate of injuries based on that data is
unreliable. Telephone interview with Dr. Vincent Garry, Director, Environmental
Pathology Lab, University of Minnesota (Nov. 1983).
38. A survey of attorneys would determine the number of injured parties by determining the number of clients and potential clients who are injured from hazardous
substances. As with the physician survey, the first step would be to select a sample of
attorneys throughout the state. Attorneys would be contacted to determine if they
had clients who had been injured as a result of exposure to any hazardous substances
as defined by MERLA. The degree of impairment would be determined to estimate
the potential economic loss which the client was suffering. A statewide estimate of
hazardous substance victims would be extrapolated from the responses of the representative sample of attorneys.
A distinct advantage of the attorney survey is that many individuals who have
already been adequately compensated by health insurance or other compensation
schemes will not go to attorneys for further compensation through the tort system.
The survey will not count these individuals as victims because they have already received adequate compensation.
For the results of a survey of Minnesota attorneys conducted to determine the
number of individuals injured by hazardous waste, see J.D. PRINCE & P. HAMILTON, A
STUDY OF COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCE EXPOSURE, A REPORT OF THE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON WASTE MANAGEMENT TO THE MINNESOTA
LEGISLATURE, pt. I, at 23-25 (Dec. 1984) (132 individuals claiming injury or exposure
to toxic substances) [hereinafter cited as WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMISSION REPORt].
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and, if injuries number only in the tens of people, the survey
may miss injured persons altogether.
A survey of the press coverage of hazardous substance-related stories showed an increasing amount of coverage, reflecting an increasing public interest in the subject, but provided
no dependable information upon which an estimate could be
based. 39
A survey of attorneys was made by the Study.40 The sample
was developed by compiling a list from the Minnesota Trial
Lawyers Association (MTLA), from the MPCA, and from reference to news media reports of attorneys known to have dealt
with some hazardous substance-related claims. Each of these
attorneys was contacted to determine the number of clients
which the attorney was aiding in hazardous substance litigation
or negotiations, and also to obtain referrals to other attorneys
practicing in hazardous substance litigation. After a number of
attorneys were contacted and referrals added to the initial list,
it was found that responses to the referral question provided
names which were already on the list, indicating that all or
nearly all attorneys with hazardous substance-related claims
had been contacted.
The results of this survey showed that 132 people in Minnesota were claiming injury from hazardous substances. Most of
the claims were for the costs of replacing a water supply but a
few persons had alopecia or cancer. A few persons who contacted attorneys decided not to litigate because of costs. There
did not seem to be an accelerating trend in the number of consultations or suits in the last five years.
Finally, California has implemented an administrative compensation scheme for personal injury victims of hazardous substance exposure. The limited claims experience under this
scheme was examined. An effort was made to compare Cali39. The press is also likely to try to contact injured parties because such specific
incidences of injury along with an interview of the injured party would be a newsworthy event.
A press survey will not be an accurate indicator of the number of claims which
might arise under an administrative compensation system. However, the press survey will indicate the amount of public interest in the subject, and it will be of interest
to compare the injuries indicated by the press with the injuries indicated by other
methods. For a discussion of the survey of Minneapolis Star and Tribune articles as
another method of estimating the number of people injured by hazardous wastes in
Minnesota, see WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 25-26.
40. See WASTE MANAGEMENT COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 38, at 23-25.

HeinOnline -- 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 672 1985

HAZARDOUS WASTES

1985]

673

fornia, a state with a fund of very limited accessibility and coverage and a much larger population, with Minnesota. The
California study revealed that the number of persons filing
claims for injuries in their persons or property is around ten
per year and the number of inquiries about property damage
claims is about 107 per year. The number of people with exclusively personal injuries is presumably smaller.41
Based on all of this information the LCWM Study estimates
that the number of persons injured in Minnesota each year as a
result of exposure to hazardous substances numbers in the
tens of persons. Obviously, that indirect estimate does not
provide a precise figure. It is, however, an estimate based on
the best information available and is the best estimate to date
of the scope of the problem in Minnesota.
II.

THE LIMITATIONS OF EXISTING REMEDIES AND

COMPENSATION SYSTEMS FOR TOXIC TORT VICTIMS

Victims of hazardous substance releases in Minnesota may
choose from various common law and statutory remedies.
These include MERLA's strict liability cause of action; traditional tort law theories of liability and damages, modified in
part by statute; workers' compensation if the injury arises out
of the victim's employment; private health and disability insurance plans; and public survivor, disability, and health insurance plans including Medicare and Medicaid. This section
examines the effectiveness of these existing remedies in solving the problem of victim compensation.
A.

MERLA's Response to Traditional Legal Limitations to Recovery
1.

Scope of Liability and Recovery Under MERLA

As the law of torts has developed, fault-based liability has
been displaced by strict liability with respect to a number of
activities, such as the manufacture and sale of defective consumer products. MERLA is part of this development in the
law. 42 Section U5B.05, subdivision 1 of MERLA provides a
41. Telephone interview with Gerald Jones, Program Coordinator for the Hazardous Substance Program, State Board of Control, California (March 22, 1985).
This agency is not the only one available for victims of hazardous substance exposure
in California. Other agancies may contain additional data that is not reflected in the
data compiled by the California Hazardous Substance Program. Id.
42. See Environmental Response and Liability Act, ch. 121,1983 Minn. Laws 310
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statutory remedy for victims of hazardous substance releases: 43
"[A]ny person44 who is responsible for the release45 of a hazardous substance from a facility46 is strictly liable. . . for. . .
d amages . . . . "47
a.

Liability Principle
t.

Strict liability

At common law, a person injured or suffering property or
other losses as a result of exposure to hazardous substances (a
"toxic tort") generally had to show that his injury or loss was
the result of someone's "fault," that is, that someone had acted
negligently or without care, causing the injury or loss. In some
special cases, liability was "strict," that is, imposed without
proof of negligence. 48 This strict liability approach has recently been expanded to include toxic torts. These injuries
(most sections of the act were effective July I, 1983) (codified at MINN. STAT. § 115B
(1984)).
43. Section 115B.04, subd. I of MERLA also provides a remedy, but the damages available under that section are different in kind from the damages available
under § 115B.05, subd. 1. Section 115B.04, subd. I(a)-(c) allows the recovery of
"[a]1I reasonable and necessary response costs incurred by . . . political subdivision[s] . . . [a]1l reasonable and necessary removal costs incurred by any person; and
. . . [a]1l damages for any injury to . . . natural resources . . . . " Id. Section
115B.05, subd. 1(a), (b), on the other hand, allows recovery of damages of a more
personal nature, including individual economic loss and health care costs. Id.
44. "Person" is defined as "any individual, partnership, association, public or
private corporation or other entity including the United States government, any interstate body, the state and any agency, department or political subdivision of the
state." MINN. STAT. § 115B.02, subd. 12.
45. See supra note 6 (definition of "release").
46. "Facility" is defined as:
(a) Any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline
(including any pipe into a sewer or publicly owned treatment works), well,
pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor
vehicle, rolling stock, or aircraft;
(b) Any watercraft of any description or other artificial contrivance
used or capable of being used as a means of transportation on water; or
(c) Any site or area where a hazardous substance, or a pollutant or
contaminant, has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise came to be located.
MINN. STAT. § 115B.02, subd. 5(a)-(c).
47. Id. § 115B.05, subd. 1.
48. In Minnesota, strict liability for non-natural uses of land was adopted as early
as 1871 in Cahill v. Eastman, 18 Minn. 324 (1871). For a discussion of the application in Minnesota of strict liability based on the doctrine of Rylands v. Fletcher, see
Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 860 (Minn. 1984); II WM. MrrCHELL L. REV. 599 (1985) (Case Note on Mahowald). For a discussion of the various
common law strict liability theories, see infra notes 278-99 and accompanying text.
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and losses are an inevitable consequence of the generation,
use, and disposal of hazardous substances in our society. It is
considered inequitable to require those injured to bear the
cost of toxic injury unless they can show someone was at fault.
This view holds that losses caused by an enterprise or activity
"ought to be borne by those persons who have some logical
relationship with that enterprise or activity. "49 Those involved
in the generation, transportation, and disposal of hazardous
substances will begin to internalize the full costs of that process so that the costs of these injuries and losses are reflected
in the prices of their goods and services. 50 The strict liability
standard imposed by MERLA makes those involved with hazardous substances liable for resulting injuries or losses regardless of care or fault. 51
ii. Joint and Several Liability

Another difficulty encountered in applying traditional common law rules to toxic torts results from the fact that several
parties can be involved in hazardous substance generation and
disposal 52-the generator of the substance, the transporter,
and the owners or operators of the disposal facility. When several parties play different and unconnected roles which lead to
the eventual release of a hazardous substance from a facility,
an injured party proceeding under the common law rules must
establish a cause of action against each party.53 These rules
require that the plaintiff bear the burden of proving that it is
more likely than not that the conduct of a defendant was a substantial factor in causing the release. When a number of parties
contribute separately to the result, this burden may be impossible to sustain against anyone of them. 54 This would mean,
for example, that a generator and a disposer of the same hazardous substance are very unlikely to be jointly liable for an
injury caused by that substance. MERLA solves this problem
49. See Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 153,

158 (1976).
50. See Comment, Common Law and the Toxic Tort: Where Does Superfund Leave the
Private Victim of Toxic Torts?, 86 DICK. L. REV. 725, 739 (1982).
51. See MINN. STAT. § I15B.05, subd. 1; if. id., subds. 2-12 (defenses to strict
liability) .
52. See 30 I (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 53.
53. Id., pt. I, at 59.
54. See id., pt. I, at 57-58.
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by making all persons who are responsible for the release of a
hazardous substance 'jointly and severally" liable for the
plaintiffs injury or loss.55
Where joint and several liability exists, an equity problem
can arise when a defendant's causal connection with the release is too attenuated to justify making him liable for the entire damage award. Section 115B.09 of MERLA addresses this
problem by limiting the individual liability of any single defendant. It specifies that where the percentage of fault attributable to a defendant is determined under the Comparative
Fault Act,56 the liability of the defendant for damages shall be
limited to two times that percentage of comparative fault. 57 In
55. See MINN. STAT. § 1158.05, subd. 1. The meaning of joint liability is that two
or more persons may be joined as defendants in the same action by an injured plantiff where the action of those defendants has produced a single injury. The Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted joint liability for indivisible injuries in other
contexts and holds that joint liability arises "whether the acts of those jointly liable
were concerted, merely concurrent, or even successive in point of time." Tolbert v.
Gerber Indus., 255 N.W.2d 362, 366 n.l (Minn. 1977) (joint liability theory applied
in product liability case).
The meaning of several liability is that each defendant may be sued individually
and held completely liable for the injury even though others have also contributed to
that injury. See W. PROSSER, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON THE LAw OF TORTS § 47, at 327-28 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as PROSSER &
KEETON]. If liability is both joint and several, the plaintiff can sue one, or all, or any
number of the responsible defendants. Kisch v. Skow, 305 Minn. 328, 331, 233
N.W.2d 732, 734 (1975). For any judgment awarded to the plaintiff, the defendants
are jointly liable. They are also each liable for the full amount if other defendants
have not been joined in the suit or are unable for any reason to help satisfy the
plaintiffs judgment. The concept ofjoint and several liability transfers the burden of
allocating and apportioning damages between or among defendants from the plaintiff to the defendants. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra, § 47, at 327-28. This transfer is
of critical importance to a plaintiff who seeks to recover the full amount of his
damages.
56. MINN. STAT. § 604.01-.02.
57. /d. § 1158.09. A potential problem in meshing MERLA and the Comparative
Fault Act arises from the use of the word "solely" in the first sentence of § 1158.05,
subd. 6, and the language of subd. 1 of § 604.0 I of the Minnesota Comparative Fault
Act. Subdivision 6, clause (d) of § 1158.05 states that it is a defense to strict liability
that the release was caused solely by an act or omission of the plaintiff. It could be
interpreted by implication that if a plaintiff is found 90% liable and the defendant
10%, the plaintiffs greater liability will not be a defense; a plaintiff 90% at fault is not
solely liable. Section 604.0 I, subd. 1 of the Comparative Fault Act, however, says
that a plaintiffs contributory fault shall bar recovery if the plaintiffs contributory
fault is greater than the fault of the person against whom recovery is sought. Since
§ 1158.05, subd. 6 is an explicit provision, it may control over the more general
language of the Comparative Fault Act.
The statutory remedy provided by § 1158.05 may be incorporated into the strictures of the Comparative Fault Act. Section 604.01, subd. 1 essentially provides for
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a situation where most of the persons responsible for a release
are insolvent or unidentifiable, this provision will severely limit
a plaintiffs recovery if the remaining solvent defendants bear a
low percentage of fault.
MERLA creates a strict, joint and several liability principle
which is designed to make recovery easier for those injured by
exposure to hazardous substances by eliminating the need to
show that someone was at fault or negligent in causing the injury or, where more than one person may have caused the injury, by eliminating the need to show that the defendants acted
jointly.
b.

Substances Covered

One of the most difficult problems in devising a toxic tort
strict liability compensation scheme is deciding which substances should give rise to liability. 58 The dangers associated
with many of the chemicals in commerce are unknown. "New
substances are continually produced and distributed, and new
evidence frequently implicates as a potential hazard a substance previously thought to be safe."59 Additionally, substances which may not be dangerous alone may form a
dangerous chemical compound when combined with other
substances. 6o
Some hazardous substances are extremely toxic, capable of
causing death even in small amounts. Other substances are
much less toxic, likely to cause nothing more than a modest
skin rash in most persons. Any substance can be more toxic to
some people than to others due to varying degrees of susceptibility among individuals.
Deciding which substances should give rise to liability is ultimately a question of policy. A special question arises regarding substances not known to be harmful when disposed of in
the comparison of a defendant's and a plaintiff's fault. Subdivision l(a) states that
"fault" includes acts or omissions that subject a person to strict tort liability. Since
§ 115B.05 subjects persons responsible for the release of hazardous substances to
strict tort liability, it may be necessary to compare a plaintiff's and a defendant's fault
under the Act in accordance with § 604.0 I, subd. I.
58. Trauberman, supra' note 9, at 220 (most difficult aspect of administering a
regulatory program).
59. /d. (footnote omitted).
60. Anderson, Hazardous Wastes: Supeifund Solution?, I WM. MITCHELL ENvrL. L.J.
162, 166 (1983).
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the past. There are a number of arguments for imposing liability for injuries caused by these substances. These arguments
include placing the cost of injury on the party best able to
spread the risk ofloss, placing the loss on the party best able to
prevent the creation of conditions giving rise to such injuries,
and avoiding costly and confusing inquiries into complicated
and speculative "state of the art" claims. 61 It has also been
argued that it is fair to impose liability on a party who does not
know of latent risk in his conduct in those cases where the defendant creates a disproportionate, excessive risk of harm relative to the victim's conduct. 62 Of course, it can also be argued
that liability should not be imposed on those who did not know
that the substances they were handling were dangerous. According to this view, only those substances known at the time
of their generation and use to be hazardous should give rise to
liability.
Although it is not entirely clear, MERLA seems to favor the
former approach. 63 It exposes responsible parties to liability
for damages caused by the release of hazardous substances. 64
Hazardous substances include substances defined as hazardous
under the federal Clean Water Act,65 the Clean Air Act,66 the
61. Beshada v.Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 90 NJ. 191,205-09,447 A.2d 539,
547-49 (1982); see also O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 179-80,463 A.2d 298,
303 (1983) (allocation of risk upon manufacturers and others in stream of
commerce).
62. For an excellent discussion of the "reciprocal risk" notion and its application
to a determination of tort liability, see Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85
HARV. L. REV. 537, 543-51 (1972).
63. It is not clear whether MER LA fixes the category of substances which are
"hazardous" for MERLA purposes as those substances which fall within the definition at the time of enactment, or whether the category expands or contracts as new
substances are added to or deleted from the various federal and state law definitions
to which MERLA refers. Any changes made in the definitions in the other laws to
which MERLA refers would presumably be incorporated into MERLA as well. See
MINN. STAT. § 645.31, subd. 2 (1984). Incorporation of the federal definitions, however, could be an unconstitutional delegation of state legislative authority, at least
with respect to the tort law provisions which are not supplementary to or designed to
achieve uniformity with a federal program. See Sheehy, Defenses and Limitations/or Section 5 Claims Under MERLA in HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION AND LIABILITY 309,
323-24 (Advanced Legal Education, Hamline University School of Law 1983).
The legislative debate over foreseeability and the ultimate inclusion of a strict
liability provision in the law certainly suggest that the legislature intended that substances not now known to be, but subsequently discovered to be, hazardous should
fall within MERLA's coverage.
64. MINN. STAT. § 115B.05, subd. I.
65. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (1982).
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,67 and under state
law. 68 Some of these substances were not known to be harmful
when used or disposed of in the past. In addition, both the
federal and state law definitions, including MERLA's definition, are open-ended. That is, they allow substances to be added to or deleted from the list of those now defined as
hazardous.
Even with this open-ended approach, some harmful chemicals may not fall within MERLA's definition. Persons injured
by releases of such substances obviously will not have the remedy that section 115B.05, subdivision 1 of MERLA provides.
Though regulated for some purposes under MERLA,69 a "pollutant or contaminant" is not defined as a hazardous substance. 70 Pollutants or contaminants would include such
things as sewage sludge and certain types of nuclear waste. 71
Natural and synthetic gases are not within the definition, nor is
oil or any petroleum derivative, unless it has been defined or
identified as a hazardous waste. 72 In addition, some releases of
potentially toxic substances, including pesticides and fertilizers, are not considered to be "releases"73 which give rise to
liability under section 115B.05, subdivision 1. Finally, substances which may be hazardous under one major federal law,
the Toxic Substances Control Act,74 are not within the MERLA
definition unless they are coincidentally covered by one of the
definitions which MERLA incorporates. While some substances subsequently discovered to be hazardous may be incorporated into MERLA's definition and subject to MERLA's
provisions, other substances now known to be hazardous are
excluded from MERLA's coverage.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1982).
67. [d. §§ 6903(5), 6921.
68. See MINN. STAT. § 116.06, subd. 13 (hazardous waste defined).
69. See, e.g., id. § 115B.17 (state response to releases of pollutants or contaminants).

70. See id. § 1158.02, subd. 13. "There is no liability under this section for damages which result from the release of a pollutant or contaminant." [d. § 115B.05,
subd. 2.
71. See id. § 116.06, subd. 13. "Hazardous waste does not include source, special
nuclear, or by-product material as defined by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended." [d.
72. See id. § 1158.02, subd. 8.
73. See id., subd. 15(a)-(d).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
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Persons Responsible

MERLA imposes its liability on "any person who is responsible for the release of a hazardous substance from a facility."75
"Responsible persons" include owners or operators of facilities where hazardous substances are located, those who arrange for the disposal or treatment of such substances, and
certain transporters of these substances. 76 Transporters are
strictly liable only if they knew they were transporting a hazardous substance, and selected the facility to which it was
transported or disposed of it in a manner contrary to law. 77
Owners of land from which a release occurs are liable only in
limited circumstances. It may be impossible to trace some hazardous substances back to their manufacturers or transporters
and some parties in the chain of responsibility may be insolvent. Thus, past and present owners of the land on which the
release occurred may be the easiest persons to identify because
their names are found in local land records. Under the common law, however, land ownership alone is not enough to create liability; other factors are necessary to create liability for
the landowner.7s According to the Second Restatement of
Torts, a landowner who owned the land when the hazardous
substance was located there is no longer liable once a subsequent purchaser of the land has discovered and abated the
condition. 79 Recent court decisions, however, have found an
exception to this general rule where the previous owner acted
affirmatively to create a dangerous situation or nuisance. so Additionally, a subsequent purchaser of land is not liable until he
has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the dangerous
condition and abate it. 8l Furthermore, recent cases have limited liability of subsequent landowners unless they have in
some way accepted or ass.ociated themselves with the creation
or maintenance of the conditions that gave rise to the hazard75. MINN. STAT. § 1I5B.05, subd. 1.
76. Id. § 115B.03, subd. 1(a)-(c).
77. Id., subd. I(c).
78. See 30I(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 47.
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 373(2), 840A(2) (1979), noted in
30I(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 47.
80. See, e.g., New Jersey v. Exxon, 151 NJ. Super. 464, 376 A.2d 1339 (1977);
Merrick v. Murphy, 83 Misc. 2d 39, 371 N.Y.S.2d 97 (1975).
81. RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, §§ 366, 839, noted in 30I(e) REPORT, supra note
4, pt. 1, at 48-49.
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ous substance's release. 82 Finally, because of the costs associated with abating the problems caused by the underground
release of chemicals, courts are reluctant to impose liability on
current owners.83
MERLA provides that an owner of real property84 on which
a hazardous substance was released is responsible ifhe is in the
business of generating, transporting, storing, treating, or disposing of hazardous substances or knowingly permitted others
to engage in such a business on that property, or if he knowingly permitted any person to use the facility for disposal of a
hazardous substance or regular disposal of waste. He is also
responsible if he knew or reasonably should have known that a
hazardous substance was located on the property at the time
he bought it and engaged in conduct by which he associated
himself with the release. In addition, ifhe significantly contributed to the release after he knew or reasonably should have
known that a hazardous substance was located in or on the
property, the landowner can be held responsible. 85
Under MERLA, past owners who allowed disposal of wastes
on their land during their tenure will remain liable even after a
subsequent purchaser has had a reasonable opportunity to discover and abate the hazardous condition. The property purchasers, on the other hand, will not be held liable unless they
affirmatively associated themselves in some way with the disposal or release. Operators of facilities will generally be responsible for their releases as will transporters who knew they were
handling hazardous substances and who chose the disposal
site.
d.

Damages Recoverable

Releases of hazardous substances may result in Injury to
both persons and property. MERLA provides for recovery for
both property loss and personal injury. Property loss includes
82. See, e.g., Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. v. Commonwealth, 35 Pa.
Commw. 443,387 A.2d 142 (1978), affd, 489 Pa. 221,414 A.2d 37 (1980).
83. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at C-7.
84. An "owner of real property" as defined by MERLA includes anyone who is in
possession of or has the right to control the use of the property. MINN. STAT.
§ 115B.0 I, subd. 11. Persons holding leases which are financing devices or persons
holding nonpossessory interests are excluded. [d., subd. 11(1).
85. [d. § 115B.03, subd. 3. It is not clear whether mere failure to remedy the
hazardous condition upon discovery is to be considered "action which significantly
contributed to the release." [d., subd. 3(e).

HeinOnline -- 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 681 1985

682

WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 11

damage to or destruction of real or personal property, including relocation costs, loss of use, and lost income or profits resulting from damage to or destruction ofproperty.86 Personal
injury losses include death, personal injury, or disease, including medical expenses and rehabilitation costs, lost income or
earning capacity, and pain and suffering. 87
Certain types of damages are not expressly recoverable
under section 115B.05. These damages include increased risk
of injury or disease, emotional distress, and medical surveillance costS. 88 Nevertheless, section 115B.12 preserves all preexisting legal remedies so that plaintiffs may argue that these
sorts of damages are also recoverable89 at least to the extent
the law previously would have allowed their recovery.90
2.

Limitations on Liability

MERLA's strict liability principle does not impose absolute
liability on hazardous waste generators and handlers.91 Instead, the Act places a number of limitations on its imposition
of liability. Strong policy reasons dictated that hazardous sub86. Id. § 115B.05, subd. l(a).

87. Id., subd. l(b).
88. Payne, Section 5 Claims Under the Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability
Act in HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION AND UABIUTY 285, 301 (Advanced Legal Education, Hamline University School of Law 1983).
89. The law allowed recovery for emotional distress as well as punitive damages
in at least some circumstances. The law did not traditionally recognize increased risk
of injury where there was no actual injury as a compensable event. Unless the plaintiff can show to a high degree of certainty that harm will occur in the future, there is
little hope of recovery. Where there is no initial actual harm, the plaintiff must show
that it is "highly probable" that harm will occur. See Seltzer, supra note 24, at 833.
Nevertheless, scientists believe that mere exposure to hazardous substances can be a
substantial harm in that such exposure can increase the risk of developing certain
types of illness or disease in the future. The increased susceptibility to future injury
is the harm. The process of evaluating the risks associated with exposure to a hazardous substance, a process called risk assessment, is based on probability theory.
Probability theory quantifies the likelihood that a particular exposure will increase a
person's chance of developing a disease in the future. See id. at 817. Although some
courts have modified the traditional approach to the concept of increased risk, see
generally id. at 833-35, it is still unlikely that this type of harm is compensable under
MERLA unless the plaintiff can show that the increased probability of future harm is
very high. But see Espel, The Minnesota Environmental Response and Liability Act, at 39-40
(1984) (to be published in an upcoming volume of the Natural Resources Journal)
(discussion of the availability of damages not specifically listed in MERLA).
90. Cj Espel, supra note 89, at 39-40 (on the availability of damages not specifically listed in MERLA).
91. See Note, Strict Liability for Generators, Transporters, and Disposers of Hazardous
Wastes, 64 MINN. L. REV. 949, 976 (1980).
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stance generators should internalize the costs of producing
such substances, but it could not be forgotten that a generator's actual causal relationship with the release may be attenuated. Such persons could not reasonably be required to pay
damages for releases that are wholly and directly caused by
outside factors. Other policies suggested further limitations
on liability. Some of these limits are incorporated into
MERLA in the form of defenses to liability. Thus, plaintiffs
may be denied recovery under MERLA because of one or more
defenses. 92 In addition, policy reasons may dictate that a cap
be placed on the amount of damages recoverable against certain parties. MERLA contains a number of these limitations as
well. 93
a.

In General

MERLA establishes a number of defenses to its strict liability
cause of action in section 115B.05, subdivision I. Certain releases of hazardous substances will not give rise to liability
under section 115B.05. "It is a defense to liability under this
section that the release. . . was caused solely by: (a) An act of
God; (b) An act of war; (c) An act of vandalism or sabotage; or
(d) An act or omission of a third party or the plaintiff. "94
There are also limitations placed on the use of these defenses. First, acts of God do not include those phenomena the
effects of which could have been prevented or avoided by the
exercise of due care or foresight by the defendant. 95 Second,
"third party, for the purposes of clause (d) does not include an
employee or agent of the defendant, or a person in the chain of
responsibility for the [release] of the hazardous substance."96
Finally, "The defenses provided in clauses (c) and (d) apply
only if the defendant establishes that he exercised due care
with respect to the hazardous substance concerned . . . ."97
Section 115B.05 provides a few other defenses when there
92.

MINN. STAT. § 1158.05, subds. 2-10; see also Note, supra note 91, at 976.
93. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
94. MINN. STAT. § 1158.05, subd. 6(a), (b).
95. See id. § 1158.02, subd. 2. An act of God is defined as "an unanticipated

grave natural disaster or other natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable,
and irresistible character, the effects of which could not have been prevented or
avoided by the exercise of due care or foresight." ld.
96. ld. § 1158.05, subd. 6.
97. ld.
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are no intervening acts: (1) once a hazardous substance has
been relocated in a different facility due to the intervening acts
of a public agency, those persons responsible for the release of
the substance from the old location are not responsible for any
release of it from the new location; (2) responsible persons are
relieved from liability for releases sanctioned by state or federal permits and standards; and (3) responsible persons are
not liable if they cause releases while assisting public agencies
in cleaning up or attempting to prevent releases of hazardous
substances. 98 Finally, an employee's claim against his employer is limited to recovery under the workers' compensation
law if the claim is compensable under that law as an injury or
disease arising out of or in the course of employment. 99
b.

Political Subdivisions

A political subdivision might be held liable under MERLA if,
for example, it operated a hazardous waste disposal facility or
if it owned land and acquiesced in the deposit of hazardous
substances on the land. In addition, a subdivision's liability
may result from its activities and obligations in supervising the
disposal of hazardous wastes.IOO The liability of political subdivisions in Minnesota is generally limited under the provisions of the Municipal Tort Liability ACt. lOi These limits are
liberalized somewhat when claims arise out of a ·release of hazardous substances. Io2
c.

Statute of Limitations

MERLA establishes a six-year statute of limitations 103 which
requires a party to resolve his dispute while the evidence is still
intact and witnesses' memories are still fresh. 104 The statute is
designed to assure the fair and effective administration of justice in a timely fashion. 105 In the case of toxic torts, however,
the desire to settle disputes in a timely fashion may be out98. Id., subds. 7-9.
99. Id., subd. 3.
100. Cf Anderson, supra note 60, at 169 (states the same proposition with respect
to the activities of the United States government).
101. MINN. STAT. § 115B.05, subd. 4.
102. Id. § 446.01-.15.
103. Id. § 115B.l1.
104. Anderson, supra note 60, at 165.
105. Dalton v. Dow Chern. Co., 280 Minn. 147, 153 n.2, 158 N.W.2d 580, 584 n.2
(1968).
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weighed by the policy of affording the plaintiff a fair opportunity to vindicate his rights. 106 Because injuries caused by toxic
torts have long latency periods, a plaintiff may suffer great
hardship if his right to bring a claim is cut off prematurely. 107
The degree to which a statute of limitations becomes a bar to
recovery depends on when the time limit set forth in the stat,.
ute begins to run. lOS
For determining when its statute of limitations begins to
run, Minnesota has adopted the "discovery rule." In Dalton v.
Dow Chemical CO.,109 the court held that the statute of limitations for negligence actions does not begin to run until damage has resulted from the alleged negligence. l1o Personal
injury damages do not "result" until physical impairment
manifests itself. l l l This means that the time limit does not begin to run until the plaintiff should reasonably have discovered
his injury or disease.
MERLA's statute of limitations does not specify a single
event that begins the running of the statute, but instead lists
certain factors that courts must consider. These include:
"(a) When the plaintiff discovered the injury or loss;
(b) Whether a personal injury or disease had sufficiently manifested itself; and (c) When the plaintiff discovered, or using
due diligence should have discovered, a causal connection between the injury, disease, or loss and the release of a hazardous substance."112 The inclusion of this last factor indicates
that courts should take a liberal view of when a person might
106. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at B-1.
107. See id., at B-2.
108. Trauberman, supra note 9, at 217.
109. 280 Minn. 147,158 N.W.2d 580 (1968) (involving personal injuries resulting
from exposure to cleaning solvent produced by defendant); see also 301 (e) REPORT,
supra note 4, pt. 2, at B-4, B-25.
110. [d. at 153, 158 N.W.2d at 584.
Ill. Fink v. Cold Spring Granite Co., 262 Minn. 393, 405, 115 N.W.2d 22, 30
(1962), quoted in Dalton, 280 Minn. at 152, 158 N.W.2d at 584 (stating that the workers' compensation statute "does not commence to run against the victim until he has
'contracted' the disease and the process of contracting the disease does not cease
until physical impairment manifests itself').
112. MINN. STAT. § 115B.l1. It is not clear whether a personal injury claim which
arises under MERLA but which was "discovered" more than six years before the
enactment of the Act is barred by MERLA's statute oflimitations. In Calder v. City of
Crystal, 318 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1982), the court indicated that it would be unconstitutional for the legislature to pass a statute creating a substantive remedy but to make
that remedy meaningless by barring access to it with a statute of limitations. [d. at
844.
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reasonably "discover" an injury or loss that can become the
basis of a claim under MERLA.
d.

Other Time Limits: The "Retroactivity" Limits

MERLA contains additional limits affecting the availability of
section 115B.05's strict liability action. First, section 115B.15
provides that no claim may be made if the release causing the
loss occurred wholly before July 1, 1983. Apparently the plaintiff bears the burden of proving that his loss resulted from a
release occurring on or after this date.ll!l
Section 115B.06 also provides that if the hazardous substance "was placed or came to be located in or on the facility
[from which the release occurred] wholly before January 1,
1960," then no claim may be made under section 115B.05}14
This provision appears to be an affirmative defense, so that a
defendant would have the burden of proving that his deposits
of substances at the facility occurred wholly before January 1,
1960.
Finally, if the hazardous substance "was placed or came to
be located in or on the facility wholly before January 1, 1973,"
all persons responsible for the release have a defense against
the action "if the defendant shows" that the substance was
placed at the facility wholly before this date and "that the activity by which the substance was kept, placed, or came to be located in or on the facility was not an abnormally dangerous
activity."1l5 The burden of proving both these factors is on
113. It is obvious that the person who deposits a hazardous substance at a facility
(the defendant) is generally more likely to have the evidence regarding when that
occurred than is a person injured by release of that substance (the plaintiff).
Although not as clear, it seems that the defendant is also more likely to have the
evidence regarding when a release occurs (especially if he is the transporter or facility
operator) than is the plaintiff. Since the major factor in determining where to place
the burden of proof on any issue is determining which party is more likely to be in
possession of the best evidence, MERLA correctly puts the burden of proving when
the deposit occurred on the defendant. See MINN. STAT. § 115B.06. That same consideration indicates that the burden of proving when the release occurred should also
be on the defendant, but this is not expressly stated in § 115B.15.
114. See id. § 115B.06, subd. I(b).
liS. See id., subds. I(a), 2. Note that this section allows all defendants responsible
for releases of substances that came to be located in or on facilities between the years
1960-1973 to escape liability under § 115B.05 if they can show that the manner in
which the substance was handled was not "abnormally dangerous". "Abnormally
dangerous" is a term taken from § 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Section 520 sets up a multifactor test for determining whether a particular activity may
be deemed "abnormally dangerous". RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 520.
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the defendant.
These provisions of MERLA are, in effect, a statute of repose.11 6 Statutes of repose are a byproduct of the development of strict products liability law. Such statutes designate a
period of time, following the manufacture or sale of a product
or, in MERLA's case, following the deposit of substances at a
facility, after which a strict liability action is prohibited. I 17 The
policy reasons advanced for the introduction of statutes of repose focus on the benefits of encouraging progress in the
processing of claims, eliminating potential abuses from old
claims, and creating certainty. I 18
The distinction between a statute of repose and a statute of
limitations can be seen by the following example: A hazardous
substance is deposited at a facility in 1959. A release began in
1970 and continues today. The plaintiff discovers an injury
caused by this release and the causal relationship between his
injury and the release in 1980. The plaintiff would not be prevented from bringing a claim by the six-year statute of limitations which began upon discovery in 1980. According to the
statute of repose, however, he would not be able to successfully sustain the claim if the defendant showed that the deposit
was made prior to 1960.
Section 115B.06 is intended to moderate the "retroactivity"
of section 115B.05, which imposes liability on those who generated and transported waste before the Act's passage. Section 115B.15, which limits the applicability of section
115B.05's strict liability to releases occurring after the Act's effective date, also limits the Act's retroactivity.
In sum, the strict, joint and several liability rule of section
115B.05 is limited in its effect. Some provisions preclude liability altogether for certain acts. Others limit liability when a
political subdivision is the defendant. Finally, a statute of limi116. "Although the term 'statute of repose' has traditionally been used to encompass statutes of limitation, in recent years it has been used to distinguish ordinary
statutes of limitation from those that begin 'to run at a time unrelated to the traditional accrual of the cause of action.''' Bolick v. American Barmag Corp., 306 N.C.
364,367-68,293 S.E.2d 415, 417-18 (1982) (quoting McGovern, The Variety, Policy
and Constitutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. V.L. REV. 579, 584
(1981».
117. Anderson, supra note 60, at 165.
118. See McGovern, supra note 116, at 588 (analyzing public policy of product liability statutes of repose).
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tations requires a plaintiff to make his claim within six years of
discovering the fact of his injury and its cause.
3.

Proof of Causation

There are two major problems faced by those injured as a
result of exposure to hazardous substances. First, they must
demonstrate that their injury or loss was caused or significantly
contributed to by exposure to a hazardous substance. Second,
they must prove that the defendant is responsible for the substance causing the injury.
a.

Proving That a Hazardous Substance Caused the Injury

In a toxic tort case, the plaintiff must demonstrate a causal
connection between the loss or injury complained of and the
environmental condition for which the defendant is allegedly
responsible. II9 Even if it can be demonstrated that a person's
injury or loss is caused by exposure to a hazardous substance,
he must also show that a particular exposure is the one which
significantly contributed to his injury. The long latency period
associated with injuries from hazardous substance exposure
complicates this problem. I20 Epidemiological studies indicate
that cancer, for example, may take fifteen to twenty years to
develop. 121
During the latency period the plaintiff may have moved to
different locations, and may have exposed himself to a number
of environmental hazards or toxic substances. 122 As a result,
his injury may have no single cause. 123 Many chronic diseases
result from multifactorial etiology-several factors interacting
at the same time in complex ways to produce harm.I24 The
119. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 70.

120. See id.
121. Seltzer, supra note 24, at 811. An individual may lead a normal, healthy life
for years without any apparent symptoms and then suddenly experience visible effects from the chemical exposure. Id. (citing S. EpSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER 2
(1978».
122. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 70.
123. Seltzer, supra note 24, at 811 (citing DIVISION OF LABORATORIES AND EPIDEMIOLOGY, NEW JERSEY STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH, AN EPIDEMIOLOGIC INVESTIGATION OF
CLUSTERS OF LEUKEMIA AND HODGKINS DISEASE IN RUTHERFORD, NEW JERSEY 17
(1979».
124. Trauberman, supra note 9, at 199; see also Seltzer, supra note 24, at 811-12 ("at
each stage of a chemical's migratory pathway to the victim . . . chemical transformation, dilution, and recombination with other new compounds may occur").
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victim may be exposed to a wide variety of contaminants,
preventing the identification of a single "responsible" substance. This becomes even more problematic in cases where a
person's health may be affected by factors other than the exposure to a substance at a particular location. These factors may
include "diet, smoking, genetic predispositions, age, and prior
exposure to chemicals."125 .
Not all persons exposed to hazardous substances will contract disease. At present, there is no empirical method that can
accurately predict which persons exposed to hazardous substances will develop diseases or other injuries. Moreover,
scientists have been unable to determine an absolutely safe
level of human exposure to hazardous substances. 126
The problems of demonstrating cause and effect do not
bode well for a plaintiff seeking to recover damages in a court
of law. Both the common law and MERLA firmly place the
burden of proving legal causation on the plaintiff. 127 To prove
legal causation, the plaintiff must show, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that it is more probable than not that the defendant's conduct was a "substantial factor in causing the alleged
injury."128 The causal connection between the defendant's release and the plaintiffs injury cannot be proven by showing "a
'mere possibility' of causation, even though such showing is
scientifically supportable."129 Nor can it be met by showing
that exposure to the hazardous substance increases the risk of
125. Seltzer, supra note 24, at 812.
126. /d. at 810.
127. [d. at 821.
128. [d.; see Flom v. Flom, 291 N.W.2d 914, 917 (Minn. 1980) ("proximate cause
exists if negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury"); see also
Waite v. American Creosote Works, Inc., 295 Minn. 288, 291, 204 N.W.2d 410,412
(1973) (in a strict products liability case a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that a defect caused the injury).
Case law provides examples of toxic tort plaintiffs unable to meet their burden of
proof. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Williams, 222 Miss. 538, 76 So. 2d 365
(1954) (failure to prove direction taken by contaminants in the ground and between
origin of contaminant and injury); Schlitchkrull v. Mellon-Pollock Oil Co., 301 Pa.
560,152 A. 832 (1930) (failure to prove one of several chemicals caused the disease).
See generally Whitehead & Christenson, Common Law Defenses in Hazardous Waste and
Toxic Tort Cases after MERLA in HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION AND LIABILITY 261,
264-66 (Advanced Legal Education, Hamline University School of Law 1983).
129. Seltzer, supra note 24, at 821-22; see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 55, § 41.
According to Prosser and Keeton, "As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be
limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of such
significance that the law is justified in imposing liability." [d. at 264.
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harm in the future.l 3o
Proof of causation in a hazardous substance personal injury
case often requires large amounts of sophisticated, expensive
medical and scientific evidence to demonstrate the causal connection between a disease and an environmental exposure. 131
Evidence may be required which shows that the kind of exposure, its duration or frequency, and its intensity could add to
or produce the kind of disease or injury suffered by the plaintiff.132 Even with the best possible evidence, however, "most
plaintiffs can only show that it is statistically probable that the
exposure caused his injury."133 A toxicologist appearing as an
expert witness for the plaintiff may be able to state with assurance that exposure to a particular level of the hazardous substance is capable of causing an increase of disease in the
exposed population. That witness, however, may not be able
to testify that the individual plaintiff's disease was, more probably than not, caused by exposure to a particular hazardous substance release. 134
MERLA attempts to mitigate the problems of demonstrating
causal connection in claims for death, personal injury, or disease. Minnesota Statutes section 115B.07 states that a "court
may not direct a verdict against the plaintiff on the issue of
causation if the plaintiff produces evidence sufficient to enable
a reasonable person to find that:
(a) the defendant is a person who is responsible for the
release;
(b) the plaintiff was exposed to the hazardous substance;
130. Seltzer, supra note 24, at 822; Hamil v. Bashline, 243 Pa. Super. 227, 233-35,
364 A.2d 1366, 1369-70 (1976) (to meet causation requirement, conduct which increased risk of harm must also have caused harm).
To prove a causal link between the agents released from the hazardous
waste site and the injury at issue, the plaintiff must fulfill four essential conditions of the traditional approach to legal causation. First, the plaintiff
must substantiate the presence of significant amounts of the pollutant which
is alleged to have caused the injury. Second, the plaintiff must reconstruct
the manner in which the exposure occurred by tracing the path of contaminant migration from the waste site to the victim. Third, the plaintiff must
identify the source of the contamination and show a breach of due care by
the defendant. Fourth, the plaintiff must demonstrate the effect of the pollutant in question on the injured person.
Seltzer, supra note 24, at 821-22.
131. 301(e} REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 70-71.
132. See id.
133. Anderson, supra note 60, at 168.
134. Trauberman, supra note 9, at 200.
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(c) the release could reasonably have resulted in plaintiff's
exposure to the substance in the amount and duration
experienced by the plaintiff; and
(d) the death, injury, or disease suffered by the plaintiff is
caused or significantly contributed to by exposure to
the hazardous substance in an amount and duration ex~
perienced by the plaintiff. 135
Cumulatively, clauses (a) through (d) amount to a substan~
tial factor test. Clause (d) for instance, requires that the injury
suffered by the plaintiff must be caused or significantly contrib~
uted to by exposure to the hazardous substance. The words
"significantly contributed to" seem to be equivalent to a substantial factor test. In addition, section 115B.07 states: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to relieve the plaintiff of
the burden of proving. . . the causal connection between the
release of the hazardous substance . . . and the plaintiffs
death, injury, or disease."136 Note, however, that clause (d)
says that the plaintiff need only show that his injury is significantly contributed to by exposure to the hazardous substance
in an amount and duration experienced by the plaintiff, not
that his exposure to the substance caused his injury.
Both the legislative debates on section 115B.07 and the fact
that it is included in the Act indicate that the legislature intended to change some part of the common law on causation
rather than simply codify it. Moreover, the apparent purpose
of the change was to make it less difficult for injured persons to
get over the causation hurdle. Until courts begin to construe
and apply this section, it remains to be seen whether section
115B.07 achieves this purpose.
It is likely that this language will have no practical effect on
the type of evidence considered on the causation issue or on
the way courts instruct the trier of fact to assess that evidence.
If the plaintiff produces sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable person to find the four factors listed in clauses (a) through
(d), however, the court cannot direct a verdict against the
plaintiff for failure to present enough evidence to sustain a
showing of a causal connection. Even without this language in
MERLA, it seems very unlikely that a court would direct a verdict against a plaintiff who had made the showings listed in
135. MINN.
136. Id.

STAT.

§ 1158.07.
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clauses (a) through (d), but would instead let the evidence go
to the trier of fact. This provision in MERLA is therefore unlikely to mitigate the problems of demonstrating causal connection in cases of this kind, and proving causation remains a
major roadblock to a plaintiffs success in this type of case.
Section 115B.07 also states, "Evidence to a reasonable medical certainty that exposure to the hazardous substance caused
or significantly contributed to the death, injury or disease is
not required for the issue of causation to be submitted to the
trier of fact."137 This provision is not a significant departure
from the common law position in Minnesota, but this language
at least makes it clear that no such requirement exists. 138
137. /d.
138. In cases of chemically induced diseases, it is often impossible for medical
experts to testify with certainty that a particular disease resulted from a specific
chemical. Nevertheless, evidence sufficient to establish legal causation will be present if a plaintiff can show that the disease more likely than not resulted from the
exposure.
The difference between medical and legal causation is illustrated by Daly v.
Bergstedt, 267 Minn. 244, 126 N.W.2d 242 (1964). In Daly, six physicians testified
that there was no causal connection between a bruise to the plaintiffs breast and her
breast cancer, while one doctor expressed the opinion that the cancer could develop
from the bruise. The case was allowed to go to the jury, which found for the plaintiff.
The defendants claimed that there was no factual basis in the record to establish a
causal connection between the injury and the disease. The supreme court said:
The point raised by [defendants] is not new. It arises because of the
difference in the medical and legal approach to the question of causation.
In the case before us, it seems that [defendants] refused to recognize that
legal determination for responsibility may differ from medical findings as to the cause or
source of a disease.
Id. at 249, 126 N.W.2d at 246 (emphasis added).
The Daly court held that the record was sufficient to present the question of
causation to the jury. The court rejected the defendants' claim that it could not be
medically established that a single trauma can cause cancer, and held that legal cause
had been established. The court further noted that inferences could be drawn from
the chain of events from the time of the accident to the time when the cancer developed, and that such inferences, "if rational and natural, which follow from a sequence of proved events, may be sufficient to establish causal connection without any
supporting medical testimony." /d. at 250, 126 N.W.2d at 247.
The court also rejected defendants' contention that the verdict should be overturned because the proof was uncertain and speculative. In fact, there was no testimony which had been presented "to a medical certainty." The court quoted from its
earlier decision in Weller v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 239 Minn. 298, 303, 58 N.W.2d
739, 742 (1953) as follows:
It is well settled that a medical expert's opinion need not be free from
doubt or capable of demonstration. It is only necessary that it be in his
judgment true. . . . The use of the words 'the most likely diagnosis' does
not make the testimony speculative or conjectural but merely indicates the
problem of all experts that although the opinion be based upon tests and
methods recognized and prescribed by the medical profession, nevertheless
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Proving Responsibility for an Injury-Causing Hazardous
Substance

Once a person has demonstrated that his injury or loss is
caused by a particular release, he must show that the defendant
is responsible for that release. Under MERLA, establishing responsibility may be relatively simple in some cases. In other
cases, for example those involving generators and transporters
of the hazardous substance,l39 proof of responsibility may be a
more painstaking task. 140 Proof of responsibility in these cases
would require demonstrating that the released substance was
transported to the facility by the transporter and originally
generated by the generator.
Once a site is identified as the facility from which the release
occurred, analyzing its contents presents barriers because of
the sampling process. Because there is danger of aggravating
a substance release during sampling, only a limited number of
samples can be taken. These samples may not reflect the contents of the entire site, and may not always prove accurate.l 41
In addition, the site may contain substances generated by a
number of firms. These firms may have hired a number of different companies to transport their chemicals to the facility.
As a result, the substances described at the facility may never
be traced back to the firms that generated or transported them.
Sites may have been abandoned, with no record of companies
responsible for the wastes deposited there. At other sites,
there may have been inadequate recording of deposits.
Normally, the plaintiff has the burden of proving causation
by a preponderance of the evidence.l 42 This can be difficult
there is always the possibility of error. . . . Where there is such a difference
of opinion and where the opinion of a reputable medical expert is submitted
that in plaintiffs case the trauma which resulted from the accident was a
precipitating factor in bringing on the condition, the causal relationship between the accident and the disease described becomes one for the jury's
determination.
Daly, 267 Minn. at 251, 126 N.W.2d at 247 (quoting Weller, 239 Minn. at 303, 58
N.W.2d at 742).
139. See MINN. STAT. § 115B.03., subd. l(b), (c).
140. Cj. Barsky, Abandoning Federal Sovereign Immunity: Public Compensation for Victims
of Latently Defective Therapeutic Drugs, 2 J. PROD. L. 20, 32-34 (1983) (discussing difficulty of identifying drug manufacturers).
141. See Zazzali & Grad, Hazardous Wastes: New Rights and Remedies?, 13 SETON HALL
L. RE~44~452 (198~.
142. See Hall, The Problem of Unending Liability for Hazardous Waste Management, 38
Bus. LAw. 593,610 (1983).

HeinOnline -- 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 693 1985

694

WILLIAM MITCHELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. II

when there are many possible defendants and the problem is
showing which one of them is responsible for the release that
actually caused the plaintiff's harm. Some courts have begun
to respond to this problem by easing or shifting the plaintiff's
burden of apportionment and proof "by the use of presumptions or other legal mechanisms based upon what they perceive to be 'fair.' "143 Several theories have been advanced,
including concert of action, alternative liability, enterprise liability, and market share liability}44 These theories shift the
burden of apportionment or proof to the defendants if the
plaintiff has established a cause of action against each of them
but is unable to show the relative degree of responsibility
among them or a causal relation between his injury and a specific defendant. 145 The theories vary in three important aspects: whether they shift the burden of apportionment or
proof,146 whether all possible defendants must be joined, and
the degree to which defendants must have acted in concert or
agreement. 147
Under the concert of action theory, a defendant is liable ifhe
143. /d.
144. Id.
145. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 55.
146. The concept of shifting the burden of apportionment and the concept of
joint and several liability have been muddled by commentators. See, e.g., id. at 54.
Joint and several liability is merely the result of shifting the burden of apportionment
from the plaintiff to the defendant. The theories noted in the text ease the plaintiff's
proof problems and allow such burden-shifting to occur. In addition, the concept of
shifting the burden of apportionment should be distinguished from the concept of
shifting the burden of proof. Shifting the burden of apportionment allows the plaintiff to establish liability against each defendant, without having to prove how much at
fault each defendant was. The shifting of the burden of proof, if it does occur, will
happen before the shifting of apportionment or the finding of joint and severalliability. Once the plaintiff has established facts which allow the shifting of the burden of
proof, it is incumbent upon the defendant to prove that his actions were not responsible for the plaintiff's injury. If the defendant fails in this attempt, joint and several
liability will be established and he will have the burden of apportioning responsibility
between himself and his co-tortfeasors.
147. See id. at 55. Most of the cases that have employed these theories involve
diethystilbestorol (DES). DES is a synthetic estrogen which was prescribed for 1.5 to
3 million pregnant women from 1947 to 1971, and has been linked to cancer in the
daughters of the mothers who ingested the drug. Id. pt. 2, at C-19. There are
enough similarities between DES and toxic tort cases to make the DES cases analogous authority. See id. In both, the injury does not appear until a significant length of
time has passed. Causation problems appear in both types of cases since physiological disorders are impossible to trace with complete certainty. Finally, the identification of defendants is difficult in both types of cases due to lapse of time and loss or
disposal of records. See id. pt. 2, at C-19, C-20.
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harms the plaintiff while committing a tortious act in concert
with others or pursuant to a common design. 148 Alternative
liability, unlike concert of action, allows a plaintiff to shift the
burden of proof to several independently acting tortfeasors. 149
148. Id. pt. I, at 56; see RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 876(a). Parties act in concert when they act in accordance with an agreement to cooperate in a particular line
of conduct or to accomplish a particular result. Id. § 876(a) comment on clause (a).
The agreement need not be express; it may be implied and understood to exist from
the conduct itself. Id. A concert of action under these circumstances is a true joint
tort, and once the fact of a tortfeasor's liability is established he is jointly and severally liable for the entire award. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 73, 289
N.W.2d 20, 25 (1979).
The concert of action theory found favor with courts in at least two DES cases.
See Abel, 94 Mich. App. at 72-73, 289 N.W.2d at 24-25; Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79
A.D.2d 317,436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1981). The Abel court held that plaintiffs bare allegation in her pleadings that various drug manufacturing firms had engaged in tortious
concerted action through the marketing of DES was sufficient to withstand a motion
for summary judgment. Abel, 94 Mich. App. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 25. The Bichler
court held that the evidence supported a jury finding that the drug manufacturer had
engaged in concerted actions with other drug manufacturers. Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at
330,436 N.Y.S.2d at 633. The court pointed to the manufacturers' pooling of in formation, agreement on the same basic chemical formula, and the adoption of the defendant's literature as a model for package inserts for joint submission to the FDA.
See id.
One problem associated with applying the concert of action theory to strict liability cases is the requirement that there be acts of a tortious character in carrying the
common design or plan into execution. See Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp.
1004, 1015 (D.S.C. 1981); RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 876(a) comment on clause
(b). The requirement of "tortious character" is most easily satisfied when the case
involves an intentional or negligent tort. Cases involving strict liability present a
problem. The Restatement, in fact, takes no position on whether the concert of action theory is applicable to actions involving strict liability. RESTATEMENT, supra note
79, § 876 caveat. The Bichler court solved this problem by applying the concert of
action theory to non-negligent collective action on the part of a manufacturer. See
Bichler, 79 A.D.2d at 328-30, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632-33. Its justification for doing so
was that passage of time and industry practice had resulted in the plaintiff being unable to identify the specific manufacturer responsible for her injury. Id. at 328-29,
436 N.Y.S.2d at 632. Other courts have not followed this approach. In Lyons v. Premo
Pharmaceutical Labs, Inc., the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, stated
that "[t]he purpose of [concert of action] is not so much to solve problems ofidentification as to deter anti-social behavior." 170 NJ. Super. 183, 193,406 A.2d 185, 190
(1979).
Another problem is that the theory may not apply if the plaintiff fails to establish
the existence of an express or tacit agreement or a common plan among manufacturers. Parallel action alone may not suffice. See Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1016. Consequently, the concert of action theory may be difficult to apply in hazardous waste
cases. There are more manufacturers and less interaction in the chemical disposal
industry than there are in the drug industry. This makes it hard to prove the tacit
understanding necessary for concert of action. See 30 I (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2,
at C-22, C-23.
149. See id. at C-23.
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Its elements are: (1) tortious conduct on the part of two or
more actors; (2) harm caused to the plaintiff by at least one of
them; and (3) uncertainty as to which one has caused the
harm.I5o
Enterprise liability combines features of the alternative liability and concert of action theories. 15I It applies where multiple defendants exercise actual collective control over a
150. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 433B(3). The case that established alternative liability as a viable theory of tort law was Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199
P.2d 1 (1948). The Restatement provides a concise summary of the facts in Summers:
A and B, independently hunting quail, both negligently shoot at the same
time in the direction of C.- C is struck in the face by a single shot, which
could have come from either gun. In C's action against A and B, each of the
defendants has the burden of proving that the shot did not come from his
gun, and if he does not do so is subject to liability for the harm to C.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 433B(3) illustration 9. The purpose of the theory is to
prevent proven wrongdoers, some or all of whom have inflicted an iJ1iury upon an
innocent plaintiff, to escape liability merely because the nature of their conduct has
made it impossible or difficult to prove which one of them has caused the harm.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 433B(3) comment on subsection (3)f
In Abel u. Eli Lilly & Co., the court held that the facts of the case were in conformity with the requirements of the alternative liability theory. See 94 Mich. App. at 7677, 289 N. W .2d at 26. The plaintiff alleged that all defendants had acted wrongfully
in producing and manufacturing a defective product (DES), and that each plaintiff
was injured by the product of one or the other defendant. See id. at 71, 289 N.W.2d
at 24. The plaintiffs' complaint also alleged that all the defendants named constituted all of the known manufacturers of DES whose products were distributed in
Michigan during the relevant time period. /d. at 67, 289 N.W.2d at 22.
The main roadblock to recovery under alternative liability is the requirement
that the harm must have resulted from the conduct of some one of the defendants.
See RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 433B(3) comment 9. In Sind ell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26 Cal. 3d 588,602-03,607 P.2d 924, 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, 139 (1980),
five companies had been joined as defendants, out of approximately 200 drug companies which make DES, any of which might have manufactured the injury-producing
drug. The court noted that the possibility that any of the five defendants supplied
the DES to plaintiff's mother was so remote that it would be unfair to require each
defendant to exonerate itself. /d. .
Sindell demonstrates the limits of the use of alternative liability in the case of
hazardous waste releases. The plaintiff would have to join either all the generators
and transporters who dumped chemicals at the facility or all the generators who manufacture toxic chemicals. In addition, he would have to show that all acted tortiously
in some respect. If one of the polluters has gone out of business, alternative liability
would not be applied. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at C-26. The Restatement
recognizes the possibility that the requirement of joining all possible defendants
might be modified due to the fact that one of the actors involved is not or cannot be
joined as a defendant, or because of the effect ofJapse of time, or because of subs tantial differences in the conduct of the actors or the risks which they have created.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 433B(3) comment on subsection (3)11.
151. 301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at C-29.
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particular risk-creating product or activity.152 The plaintiff
must prove defendants' joint awareness of the risks and their
joint capacity to reduce or affect those risks. 15s
Market share liability is a modification of the alternative lia152. Hall v. E.!. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353, 376 (E.D.N.Y.
1972).
153. [d. at 378. Joint control can be shown in one of three ways: (1) plaintiffs
could prove the existence of an explicit agreement and joint action among the defendants, i.e., concert of action; (2) plaintiffs could submit evidence of defendants'
parallel behavior sufficient to support an inference of tacit agreement or cooperation;
or (3) plaintiffs could submit evidence that defendants, acting independently, adhered to an industry-wide standard or custom. See id. at 373-74; see also 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at C-29 to C-30. Where such standards or practices exist,
the industry operates as a single enterprise by stabilizing the production costs of
safety features and establishing an industry-wide custom which influences the applicable standard of care. Hall, 345 F. Supp. at 374.
In order to set up a prima facie case of enterprise liability, plaintiffs must first
demonstrate that defendants breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiffs. This
could be accomplished by showing that the industry followed an inadequate standard. Second, the plaintiffs must establish that the group-created risk, that is, the
standard, caused their injuries. Third, the plaintiffs must show by a preponderance
of the evidence that the products involved in the accident were the products of the
named defendants. Plaintiffs, however, do not have to identify which defendant manufactured the product. See id. at 379. In other words, unlike altern!\tive liability, and
similar to the market share approach, enterprise liability would not require all the
potential il1iury-causers to be joined. See 301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at C-30.
Once plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of enterprise liability, the burden shifts to
the defendants to prove that their product did not cause plaintiffs injury. See Hall,
345 F. Supp. at 380.
Hall, which developed the concept of enterprise liability, involved suits against
manufacturers and a trade association. In separate incidents 13 children had been
injured by blasting caps due to inadequate warnings and inadequate safety features.
The industry-wide practice alleged by the plaintiffs was a longstanding custom of not
placing a warning message on individual blasting caps. [d. at 359.
Enterprise liability has not been imposed by courts in DES cases. 301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at C-30. One court has called it "[an] expansive notion of
vicarious liability. . . which would render every manufacturer an insurer not only of
the safety of its own products, but of all generically similar products made by others
. . . . " Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1017. Furthermore, enterprise liability would be most
applicable to industries composed of a small number of units. See Hall, 345 F. Supp.
at 378. The doctrine migh·t be unreasonable if applied to a decentralized industry
composed ofthousands of producers. [d.; accord, Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538
F. Supp. 593, 598 (M.D. Fla. 1982); Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1017; Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at
609, 607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. The doctrine may not apply in the
absence of industry delegation of safety standards to a trade association. See Morton,
538 F. Supp. at 598; Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1017-18; Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 609,607
P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143. Finally, enterprise liability might not be invoked if
the industry is following standards suggested or compelled by a governmental regulatory body. See Morton, 538 F. Supp. at 598; Ryan, 514 F. Supp. at 1018; Sindell, 126
Cal. 3d at 609,607 P.2d at 935, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 143.
For these reasons, the enterprise liability theory likely would not be employed in
hazardous waste cases. The waste generation and transportation industry is large
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bility theory.154 Unlike enterprise liability, it does not require
the plaintiff to join all of the actors who might have caused his
injury.155 The plaintiff must, however, join the manufacturers
of a substantial share of the product which injured the plaintiff.
The burden of proof is then shifted to the defendants to
demonstrate that they could not have made the substance
which injured the plaintiff. 156 If they do not succeed in overcoming this burden, they will each be liable for the proportion
of the judgment represented by their share of the market. 157
Even as these theories become more accepted elsewhere,
and decentralized and there is no delegation of standard-setting to a trade
association.
154. See Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610-12, 607 P.2d at 936-37, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-45.
155. See id. The market share liability doctrine was proposed by the California
Supreme Court in Sindell. From a policy standpoint, the theory was imposed because
"[thel defendants are better able to bear the cost of injury resulting from the manufacture of a defective product." Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 936, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
156. See id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
157. See id. In Sindell the plaintiff, a victim of cancer due to her mother's ingestion
of DES, was unable to name the specific manufacturer of the DES which her mother
had taken. /d. at 595-96, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134. She therefore joined
II of the major manufacturers of the drug and sued for relief. Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at
925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133. She alleged that the defendants failed to warn consumers
of DES' potential dangers. /d. at 594, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
Extension of the market-share liability theory to hazardous waste cases presents
some problems. It is unlikely that the plaintiff would be able to join a substantial
number of the firms in the chemical manufacturing and transporting industries because the causal connection might be too remote. Joining a substantial number of
the firms who had wastes deposited at the release site would seem to be a more
plausible approach and there is some authority for this. Liability under § 9607 of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982), is joint and several where the defendants
caused an indivisible harm. United States v. Chern-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802
(S.D. Ohio 1983). Perhaps due to uncertainty over whether this section does allow
joint and several liability, and perhaps realizing that the plaintiff has severe problems
of proof, the EPA and Justice Department have sought to obtain participation by all
known contributors in the cleanup' of hazardous waste sites on a roughly pro-rata
basis, taking into account primarily the volume, and also the toxicity of the wastes for
which each party was alleged to be responsible. This approach, however, is distinguishable from the theory of market share liability in that it apportions cleanup cost
after liability has been conclusively resolved; it does not merely shift the burden of
proof.
Two courts have had negative reactions to market-share liability. The court in
Ryan v. Eli Lilly & Co., 514 F. Supp. 1004 (D.S.C. 1981), stated that it was a total
departure from all previous rules of causation and liability and that it would represent "a rejection of 'over one hundred years of tort law which required . . . a 'matching' of defendant's conduct and plaintiffs injury' " before liability would be imposed.
/d. at 1018 (quoting Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 616,607 P.2d at 939, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 147
(Richardson, j., dissenting». The court in Morton v. Abbott Laboratories, 538 F.
Supp. 593 (M.D. Fla. 1982) rejected market share liability for the same reason. Id. at
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they may not be accepted in Minnesota. For example, Summers
v. Tice, 158 the California case that founded the doctrine of alternative liability, has been cited only once in a Minnesota
Supreme Court case. 159 Minnesota does, however, recognize
the joint enterprise rule. Under this rule, when one participant
in a joint enterprise negligently causes an injury, while acting
within the scope of the enterprise, every participant in the enterprise is liable to the injured party.160 For ajoint enterprise,
however, both a mutual undertaking for a common purpose
and a right to a voice in the direction and control of the means
used to carry out the common purpose must exist. 161
In Minnesota, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the
injury resulted from the actions of the defendant rather than
from some other cause. Proof of negligence does not automatically establish that such negligence was the cause of the injury.
Negligence and causation are distinct elements of a tort and
both elements must be pleaded and proved. 162 Proof of causation is also a necessary element in proving strict products liability; the plaintiff must show that his injury was caused by a
defect in the defendant's product. 163 Since Minnesota requires
joint participation and control, and a causal connection between each participant and the injury, there is no present indication that Minnesota will adopt any of these theories to ease
the plaintiffs burden of proving causation.
c.

Summary

Despite MERLA's provision of a strict, joint and several lia599-600. The rejection of market share liability in these two cases is understandable
since they were federal diversity cases applying the law of the forum state.
158. 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
159. Mathews v. Mills, 288 Minn. 16, 20-21, 178 N.W.2d 841, 844 (1970). The
Mathews court cited Summers following a discussion of the propriety of imposing joint
and several liability where two or more persons acting independently and negligently
cause an indivisible injury. In Summers, one defendant caused the injury but joint and
several liability was imposed because the defendants' conduct made it impossible for
the plaintiff to prove which defendant actually injured him. Summers, 33 Cal. 2d at 80,
199 P.2d at 1.
160. Spannaus v. Otolaryngology Clinic, 308 Minn. 334, 339, 242 N.W.2d 594,
597 (1976); see Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
161. Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479,482 (Minn. 1979).
162. See Lyons v. SCNEI, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 169, 170 (Minn. 1978); Vanderweyst v.
Langford, 303 Minn. 575, 575, 228 N.W.2d 271, 272 (1975).
163. See Worden v. Gangelhoff, 308 Minn. 252, 254-55, 241 N.W.2d 650, 651
(1976).
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bility rule, the proof of causation remains a very substantial
hurdle for a MERLA plaintiff to overcome. Proof of causation
under common law may be even more difficult because Minnesota has not adopted the legal theories sometimes used in
other states to ease the plaintiff's burden of proof. Finally,
though it may be desirable to compensate victims who cannot
prove who caused their injury, the traditional tort law system
may be an inappropriate mechanism to achieve this goal. 164
4.

Other Practical Limitations
a.

Cost and Delay

In addition to the many limitations found in the theory and
application of existing rules of law, there are significant practical limitations on a victim's access to compensation. As one
commentator has noted, " 'Small' individual claims cannot be
handled economically in the tort litigation process." 165 Due to
the complexities involved in proving toxic tort cases, 166 the litigation tends to be extremely expensive 167 in terms of both
time and money.I 68 To prove a case, the plaintiff must often
rely on highly trained expert witnesses in both medicine and
science. Expert witnesses often command a high hourly fee for
preparing cases and testifying, and cannot be paid on a contingent fee basis. A victim will initiate legal action only if he believes that the damage award will exceed the time, effort, and
actual expenses of bringing suit. 169
Given the current judicial backlog, the legal system may be
unable to deal with a plethora of claims. A single event of exposure of a large number of people to a hazardous substance
release, or a large number of people who discover their latent
diseases at the same time, may flood the courts' calenders.I 70
Complex cases usually take several years to get to trial and, if
164. See A. Roisman, Common Law Toxic Tort Litigation: Strengths, Weaknesses, Reforms, Alternatives 2 (1983) (unpublished manuscript, on file at the William Mitchell Law Review Office).
165. R. Marzulla. Toxic Tort Claims-Possible Inadequacies in the Current Tort
System 4 (Nov. 2. 1983) (unpublished manuscript prepared for the Keystone Center
Project. on file at the William Mitchell Law Review Office).
166. Id.
167. Roisman. supra note 164. at 5.
168. Trauberman. supra note 9. at 189; Roisman. supra note 164. at 5.
169. Trauberman. supra note 9. at 189-90 & n.54.
170. Anderson. supra note 60, at 164.
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appealed, take one or two more years to be finally resolved}71
As a result, victims may have to wait to be compensated until
long, drawn-out legal proceedings have ended.
Plaintiffs with small claims or who are in need of money may
be forced to settle out of court for an amount far below their
actual damages. 172 While settlements that conserve time and
money are generally desirable for all concerned, settlement negotiations result in equitable solutions only if all parties are
well informed about damages and the probability of success,l73
For example, a victim of hazardous substances may be unaware
of the chronic effects of the chemical and may consequently
negotiate a settlement based only on the harm that has manifested itself to date,l74 Both parties may overestimate their
chances of success and be reluctant to concede any points of
negotiation.
While well-informed parties may sometimes reach equitable
negotiated solutions, there is still the problem of costly litigation when negotiations fail. Indeed, high litigation costs automatically bias negotiations against the financially weaker and
more risk-averse litigant, usually the plaintiff. Litigation costs
can be reduced by making it easier for persons with similar
claims to join together in one action. 175 This can be accomplished through the use of permissive joinder of parties under
the Federal and Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure}76 Permissive joinder is often appropriate for victims of hazardous
substance releases. Hazardous substances in one location may
affect several individuals. The similar or identical elements of
exposure may result in different types of injuries}"
Other methods of joining plaintiffs' claims include the institution of class actions 178 and the offensive use of collateral estoppel, a legal doctrine that prevents relitigation of an issue
171. Marzulla, supra note 165, at 6.
172. Traubennan, supra note 9, at 189-90.
173. See id. at 190.
174. [d. at 190-91.
175. 301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 67.
176. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a); MINN. R. CIV. P. 20.01.
177. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 67-68.
178. Marzulla, supra note 165, at 3. "A class action is a suit brought by one or
more plaintiffs on behalf of a large number of others similarly situated. The action
requires that there be common issues of law and fact and that the parties be so numerous as to make it impractical to join them as individuals." [d.
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already decided between the same parties. 179 There have also
been some significant efforts at voluntary coordination of tort
claims, as in the formation of the Dalkon Shield Group in
1974, the DES cases, actions against Chevrolet for motor
mount failure, and the MER/29 drug cases. ISO
MERLA attempts to ease the litigation costs of parties involved in toxic tort cases in section 1 15B.14. It states, "Upon
motion of a party prevailing in an action under sections
115B.O 1 to 115B.15 the court may award costs, disbursements
and reasonable attorney fees and witness fees to that party."ISI
Of course, this fee-shifting is only available after litigation and
does little to help finance the costs of preparing for and conducting the litigation.
Toxic tort victims can alleviate problems of time and cost if
they make use of permissive joinder and if they are awarded
costs under section 115B.14. All plaintiffs, however, may not
benefit. Some plaintiffs may not wish to join, preferring to rely
on their own counsel for legal expertise. They may believe
that they have a better chance of being fully compensated if
they sue individually. Furthermore, in the case of latent injuries, injured parties may have moved from the area of the release, making it difficult for a plaintiff to locate prospective
joint plaintiffs. In addition, two things must be remembered
about section 115B.14: (1) it is discretionary-a court does
not have to award costs; and (2) if the plaintiff loses, the court
may award costs to the defendant. This could deter a plaintiff
from bringing suit. In fact, such cost awards are rare, but section 115B.14's language allows a court to award costs to one
party even where the other party has not acted in bad faith.
This represents an extension of the court's preexisting
power. IS2
In sum, despite the mechanisms available to plaintiffs for
sharing or recovering litigation costs, the cost problem re179. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 250 F. Supp.
B16 (D. Ill. 1966) (discussion of the doctrine of collateral estoppel).
1BO. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 6B. In discussing the weaknesses of the
tort system, Anthony Z. Roisman suggests other solutions to the high costs borne by
toxic tort plaintiffs. See Roisman, supra note 164, at 6-7.
1B1. MINN. STAT. § 115B.14.
1B2. See id. § 549.21. "[T]he court in its discretion may award . . . costs . . . if the
party or attorney against whom costs . . . are charged acted in bad faith." Id.
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mains a substantial impediment to compensation for victims of
hazardous substance exposure.
h.

Insolvent Defendants

Another factor which must be considered is the system's
possible effects on defendants. The costs of defending hazardous waste lawsuits are likely to be quite high due to the complexity of the subject matter, and the need for sophisticated
scientific data and support by experts' testimony}83 In addition, once causation is established in a toxic tort case, defendants may face extremely high damage awards. 184 In one
asbestos-employee injury case, a $13 million single injury
award was handed down against a relatively small company.185
The cases against Johns-Manville Corporation provide another
example. Johns-Manville, the nation's largest asbestos manufacturer,186 declared bankruptcy in anticipation of a large
number of lawsuits by Manville workers stemming from their
handling of asbestos materials.
Few firms can handle this type OflOSS.187 One way to assure
that victims will be compensated is to require financial responsibility for those who run hazardous waste disposal sites. The
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA) 188
requires the EPA to establish financial standards for owners
and operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, or disposal facilities. 189 Acting under this authority, the EPA has issued
regulations requiring owners or operators of such facilities to
maintain liability insurance for injury or damage to third par183. See Anderson, supra note 60, at 170-71.
184. See Trauberman, supra note 9, at 191 n.63;

if.

Barsky, supra note 140, at 35-

37.
185. See Trauberman, supra note 9, at 191 n.63 (noting Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related
Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341, 348 (1980)).

186. Johns-Manville earned $60.3 million on its sales in 1981, enabling it to rank
18lst on the Fortune 500 list of America's largest corporations. Anderson, supra
note 60, at 167. Since 1968, Manville has been the defendant in 200,000 lawsuits and
has paid out $50 million in claims. A consulting firm advised Manville that it could
expect 50,000 more lawsuits. Manville estimated that each claim would cost $40,000
to handle and that the anticipated lawsuits would eventually cost the company over
$2 billion. See id.; Trauberman, supra note 9, at 191 n.63.
187. Anderson, supra note 60, at 171.
188. Pub. L. No. 94-580,90 Stat. 2769 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987
(1982)).
189. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924 (1982).
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ties}90 Insurance for "sudden and accidental occurrences"
must be maintained in the amount of at least $1 million per
occurrence with a $2 million annual aggregate. In addition,
owners or operators of facilities must maintain liability insurance for non-sudden occurrences in the amount of at least $3
million per occurrence with a $6 million annual aggregate, exclusive of legal defense costS}91 Furthermore, the Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency has promulgated rules requiring liability coverage for owners or operators of hazardous waste
treatment, disposal, or storage facilities}92
A variety of insurance policies are available to cover personal and property damage caused by the release of pollutants
or hazardous substances into the environment. Traditionally,
companies have carried a Comprehensive General Liability
(CGL) policy, which provides coverage for "sudden and accidental" pollution on an occurrence basis. While this type of
coverage will apply to liability arising out of a spill or other
similar event, problems arise when the effects are not known
until years after the event, or where there is gradual seeping}93 Some courts have recently stretched the scope of sudden and accidental insurance coverage to include injuries
which have not become apparent until long after the occurrence}94 These cases have prompted many insurers to stop
writing pollution liability coverage on an occurrence basis. Instead, insurers are writing environmental insurance coverage
on a claims-made basis. Under a claims-made policy, coverage
extends to any claims made for injuries resulting from releases
where the claims are presented to the insured during the period of coverage.l 95
Insurance companies have recently begun offering high-limit
190. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.147(a) (1982) (permanent status standards), 265.147(a)
(1982) (interim status standards). "This insurance had to be in effect by July 15,
1982." Hall, supra note 142, at 615.
191. 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.147(a), (b) (1982); see Hall, supra note 142, at 615.
192. See MINN. R. § 7045.0620 (Supp. 1984).
193. Hall, supra note 142, at 617-18.
194. /d. at 618; see, e.g., City of Kimball v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 190 Neb.
152,206 N.W.2d 632 (1973) (pollution of irrigation well due to seepage from city's
sewer); Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 138 NJ. Super 275, 350
A.2d 520 (1975) (oil seepage into river held sudden and accidental); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Klock Oil Co., 73 A.D.2d 486,426 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1980) (gradual discharge ofgasoline from storage tank held sudden and accidental).
195. See Hall, supra note 142, at 618.

HeinOnline -- 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 704 1985

1985]

HAZARDOUS WASTES

705

coverage for "nonsudden or gradual" pollution under Environmental/Impairment Liability (ElL) policies, which are also
claims-made policies,l96 These policies contain various liability limits l97 which apply once to each pollution incident regardless of the number of separate claims from that
incident. 198 The Pollution Liability Insurance Association, a
group of thirty-seven companies constituting a reinsurance
pool, offers a new policy for companies offering coverage for
sudden and non-sudden incidents under a single claims-made
form. The basic coverage is available up to $5 million per site
although higher express limits may be obtained,l99
These policies appear to be adequate to deal with common
law liability for releases causing environmental damage. Large
companies have obtained environmental claims-made insurance coverage that exceeds $100 million. 20o Even this kind of
insurance, however, may not be a complete panacea. Though
the policy may allow coverage to be initiated from a retroactive
date, it may not extend back to cover a release which occurred
many years ago. The policy may contain other significant limitations. For example, the ElL form commonly states that coverage applies only to specifically named sites. Also frequently
excluded from coverage are items such as damages caused by
sudden and accidental happenings, liability due to genetic
damage, damages assessed under the concept of joint and several liability, and damages due to releases from a closed or
abandoned site. 201 Finally, though the EPA may require owners and operators of facilities to obtain liability insurance,
196. /d.
197. See Stewart, Environmental Impairment Liability Insurance Availability and Cost in
HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION AND LIABILIlY 351, 353 (Advanced Legal Education,
Hamline University School of Law 1983). The premium cost for ElL varies widely
depending upon the nature of the business, the size of the firm, the number of sites
that contain toxic chemicals that the firm is responsible for, and the firm's past and
present waste management practices. Premiums vary significantly between insurance
companies due to the lack of actuarial data and the highly judgmental nature of most
rate schemes that are used to establish premiums. /d. at 353. "Environmental impairment" is defined as the "emission, discharge, dispersal, disposal, seepage, release
or escape of any liquid, solid, gaseous or thermal irritant, contaminant or pollutant
into or upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water." /d. at 355.
198. Id. at 356.
199. Hall, supra note 142, at 618-19.
200. Id. at 619.
201. See Stewart, supra note 197, at 355-58.
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there is no requirement that generators or transporters maintain the insurance.
The potentially enormous costs that may result to defendants from hazardous substance personal injury claims can exceed a defendant's ability to pay. The result is bankrupt
defendants and uncompensated plaintiffs. Insurance can help
alleviate this potential problem, but policy limitations may exclude some releases from coverage. Insolvency of defendants
may thus continue to be a major problem for injured parties.
B.

Alternatives to MERLA

Some plaintiffs will not sue under MERLA either because its
statutory provisions foreclose their suit or because they feel a
different remedy would be easier to obtain. For example, a
plaintiffs suit may be precluded by MERLA's provisions limiting retroactive liability or recovery may be limited by MERLA's
ceiling on joint and several liability.202 MERLA expressly allows toxic tort victims to seek other avenues of redress in section 115B.12. 203 Those victims who do so will find that these
other remedies are greatly limited in their usefulness.
1.

Other Statutory Remedies

Several federal environmental statutes provide for civil or
criminal actions for violations set forth in the statutes or regulations. However, statutory provisions for the recovery of
damages by private plaintiffs are rare. 204 Six federal statutes
have a significant impact on hazardous waste disposal; none
expressly provide for compensation to hazardous waste victims
for personal injury or damage. 205 Five of the statutes provide a
private citizen with the right to sue for enforcement of the stat202. MINN. STAT. §§ 115B.06, .09; see Whitehead & Christenson, supra note 128, at
263.
203. See Van de North, Hazardous Waste Litigation Common Law Causes of Action in
HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION AND LIABILITY 239, 241 (Advanced Legal Education,
Hamline University School of Law 1983).
204. See 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 72.
205. The six statutes are: (I) The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 (TSCA)
15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982); (2) The Clean Water Act of 1977 (CWA) 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1251-1376 (1982); (3) The Safe Drinking Water Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f300j(lO) (1982); (4) The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, 42
U.S.C. §§ 6901-6987; (5) The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657; and (6) The Hazardous Materials Transportation Act of 1975, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1812 (1982).
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utes' provisions. 206 The Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA)
does provide a remedy for private citizens for certain property
damages,207 but it has no mechanism to enable a private individual to trigger action by the EPA.208
The Federal Tort Claims Act 209 may provide the basis for
claims against the federal government for tortious acts of its
employees or agents. This may be useful where the federal
government owns or operates a disposal site.
The Minnesota Environmental Rights Law210 provides a civil
remedy for private citizens. It allows private citizens to bring
civil actions in the name of the state for declaratory or equitable relief against any person for the protection of publicly or
privately owned natural resources located within the state. 211
However, it has no provision for the recovery of property or
personal injury damages.
Minnesota also has a Tort Claims Act,212 which could provide the basis for tort claims against the state, and a Municipal
Tort Liability Act,213 which provides for tort claims against local units of government. Of course some basis for the state or
local unit's liability, such as negligent operation of a disposal
facility, has to be found. As noted above, there is an upper
206. See Note, supra note 91, at 952.
207. See, e.g., Pinole Properties, Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp. 283

(D. Cal. 1983) (court determined that private party could settle for certain property
damages under the provisions of § 107(a)(4)(B) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4)(B) (1982».
208. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982). Section 9607 ofCERCLA does allow a
private party who incurred cleanup or remedial costs to recover them from any responsible party. See id.
209. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 1402,2401,2671-2680 (1982). There must be a negligent or wrongful act or ommission. The FTCA compensates for injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or
ommission of any government employee acting within the scope of his office. /d.
§ 1346(b); see Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 337 (D. Utah 1984) (in action
to recover for cancer and leukemia caused by emmission of nuclear fallout in Atomic
Energy Commission testing, the jurisdictional standard requires action by an employee which falls below the standard of "due care" in executing a statute or regulation). So it would appear that strict liability-based claims cannot be brought against
the United States.
210. MINN. STAT. ch. 116B (1984).
211. See id. § 116B.03.
212. [d. § 3.736.
213. [d. § 466.01-.15.
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limit on the liability of local units of government under
MERLA, but, there is no limit on the state's liability.
2.

Implied Private Remedies

Even if a statute does not explicitly create a private right of
action for personal injury due to hazardous substance releases,
a plaintiff may claim that a private right of action is implied. 214
Over one hundred years of legal precedent support the concept of an implied right of private action arising out of a statutory provision. 215
In the case of Cort v. Ash,216 the Supreme Court listed the
necessary criteria for a private cause of action to arise out of a
federal statute. 217 The Court enumerated four factors relevant
to determining whether a private right of action should be implied: whether the claimant is a member of the class protected
by the statute; whether the act's legislative history indicates an
intention to either create or deny a private remedy; whether
implying a private remedy is consistent with the act's purpose;
and whether the cause of action is one relegated to state law. 218
Subsequent Supreme Court cases have narrowed the impact of
Cort's four factor test 219 and have declined to give equal weight
to each of the four factors, making it more difficult to find a
private right of action implied in federal statutes.
For example, in California v. Sierra Club 220 an environmental
organization and two private citizens sought to enjoin the construction and operation of certain water diversion facilities
which would allegedly degrade water quality in a delta, in violation of section 310 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations
Act of 1899. 221 Section 310 prohibits "[t]he creation of any
obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States
. • • . "222 No provision was made, however, for private en214. See 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 85.
215. See Comment, supra note 50, at 740.

216. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
217. See id. at 78; 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 86.
218. See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
219. See 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 85-88.

220. 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
221. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982); see Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 290-92; see also 301(e)
PORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 86-87.
222. 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1982).
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forcement. 2211 The Supreme Court said that "the ultimate issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right of
action. . . ."224 The Court indicated that the four Cort factors
were the criteria for determining this issue, but that they are
not entitled to equal weight. 225 The Court focused on congressional intent, saying that the inquiry is no longer "simply
who would benefit from the Act, but whether Congress intended to confer federal rights upon those beneficiaries."226
This approach looks to the legislative history for indications of
congressional intent to either create or deny a certain remedy.227 If there is neither evidence that Congress intended to
benefit a particular class, nor evidence that it intended to create a private remedy, then no private right of action exists. 228
The legislative history of the Rivers and Harbors Act provided "no indication of congressional intent to either imply or
deny a remedy for the private litigant. "229 Silence in the legislative history may demonstrate congressional intent not to create the remedy,2110 or it may demonstrate "congressional
acquiescence" in the continuance of a private right of action
that existed prior to the statute's enactment. 2111
More recently, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association,232 the Supreme Court again refused to recognize an implied right of action under an
environmental statute. 2311 The National Sea Clammers Association brought an action for damages pursuant to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act 234 and the Marine Protection and
Sanctuaries Act,235 seeking recovery for the discharge of sew223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

See id.
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 293.
See id. at 297.
[d. at 294.
See id. at 293-98; see also 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 87.
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294-98. The latter two Cart factors, consistency with

the legislative scheme and relegation to state remedies, "are only of relevance if the
first two factors give indication of congressional intent to create the remedy." [d. at
298.
229. See Comment, supra note 50, at 741.
230. [d. at 741-42 (citing Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
II, 18 (1979».
231. [d. at 742 (citing Canon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 702-03
(1979».
232. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
233. [d. at 22; see also Comment, supra note 50, at 742.
234. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1982).
235. [d. §§ 1401-1445 (1982).
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age that had resulted in the destruction of an enormous
amount of marine life. 236 The Court held that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to a private remedy under the acts, emphasizing the comprehensive enforcement provisions, including citizen suit provisions, contained within each act. In view of the
acts' comprehensive enforcement provisions, the Court concluded that it could not assume that Congress intended that
additional remedies be available to private litigants suing
under the acts.237
Most recently, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran,238 the Supreme Court seemed to relax its analysis of congressional intent when determining whether a cause of action
should be implied under a federal law. In this case, the Court
held that private parties may maintain an action for damages
caused by a violation of the Commodity Exchange Act. 239 The
Court reasoned that Congress intended to grant private litigants
a remedy under the Commodity Exchange Act when it
amended the statute in 1974. 240 Its basis for finding intent was
Congress' failure to indicate that the private remedy did not
exist in the face of prior case law which held that an implied
cause of action did exist under the Act. 241 Previous case law
had consistently recognized an implied cause of action. 242 It
did not matter that this interpretation was supplanted by later
case law. In the Court's opinion, "it [was] abundantly clear
that an implied cause of action existed under the [Act and] was
a part of the 'contemporary legal context' in which Congress
legislated in 1974."243 Thus, Congress intended to preserve
the preexisting remedy.244 In the Court's opinion, this obviated the need to apply the four factor test for determining intent. 245 Since Merrill Lynch, the Supreme Court has decided a
number of additional implied cause of action cases in which
the basic analytical approach appears to be the one used in Sea
Clammers and Merrill Lynch: to determine whether Congress in
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

453 U.S. at 4-5; see also Comment, supra note 50, at 742.
301{e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at F5-F7.
456 U.S. 353 (l982).
7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (l982).
Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 381-82.
See id.
Id. at 379.
Id. at 381.
Id. at 381-82.
See id. at 388.
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passing a given act intended, by implication, that a private
right of action be available. 246
Merrill Lynch might seem favorable for a claimant who seeks
to establish an implied cause of action, but it should be noted
that the Court's holding was limited to specific factual circumstances. Those factual circumstances are found where preexisting case law has determined that an implied right exists, and
where Congress has reexamined and amended a statute without noting the existence of such case law.
Many federal environmental statutes contain comprehensive
enforcement provisions which are often supplemented by provisions for citizen suits. In the wake of the Sea Clammers case
and in view of the narrow scope of the reasoning in Merrill
Lynch, plaintiffs seeking private relief for the violation of federal environmental statutes are not likely to prevail on an implied cause of action theory.247 The Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, for example, contains a provision for citizen
suits against the government for failure to perform a non-discretionary duty under the Act, or against a private party for
violation of the Act. 248 This language strongly suggests that
the citizen's suit is limited to declaratory or injunctive relief,
and does not provide the basis for a private action for damages. 249 In addition, language in the Act suggests that it was
enacted to provide for the health and environment of the nation in general, rather than a particular class of people. 250
CERCLA mayor may not present a different story. Like
other environmental statutes, the Act provides for elaborate
enforcement mechanisms. 251 These enforcement mechanisms,
however, are currently available only to the government. 252
Also, unlike other statutes, CERCLA has no mechanisms to enable the private individual to trigger action by the EPA.253
One commentator has suggested that CERCLA addresses vic246. Daily Income Fund v. Fox, 104 S. Ct. 831 (1984); Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 731 (1982); Jackson Transit Authority v. Local Div. No. 1285, 457 U.S. 15
(1982).
247. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at F6-F7.
248. Hall, supra note 142, at 606 (citing RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6972, 7002).
249. [d.
250. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901(b)(2), 6902 (1982).
251. See Comment, supra note 50, at 744.
252. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9604.
253. See Comment, supra note 50, at 744.
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tims exposed to hazardous substances as a class. 254 Then
again, the Act's provisions taken as a whole suggest that they
are intended to protect the national health and environment. 255 Thus, the possibility of an implied remedy existing
under CERCLA is uncertain.
The availability of implied remedies under Minnesota regulatory statutes is also uncertain. The Minnesota Environmental Rights Law may influence the result. In deciding whether
to imply a private remedy for violation of legislative enactments, the Minnesota courts would initially seek to ascertain
legislative intent. If no specific legislative intent is ascertained,
the court would usually examine the policy underlying the statute or the legislature's purpose in enacting it.256 Minnesota's
express provision of a civil suit mechanism in section 116B.03
of the Environmental Rights Law is perhaps an indication that
the legislature intended that no implied causes of action under
other statutes be available. The express purpose of the statute,
however, is to protect the natural resources of the state; not to
protect the private citizen from the health effects of hazardous
substance releases. 257 That in tum indicates that the Environmental Rights Law is not meant to preclude the availability of
any personal injury or damages cause of action, either express
or implied.
3.

Common Law Remedies
a. Trespass

Trespass is defined as unlawful, negligent, or intentional interference with another's possessory interest in land. 258 It is
not, therefore, a theory of liability which anticipates personal
injury claims. Trespass may result from invasion by escaping
waters and other substances onto adjoining lands. 259 The trespass cause of action has been used in a few cases in other juris254. See id. at 743-44.
255. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (l982).
256. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at F-9.
257. See MINN. STAT. § 116B.01.
258. See All American Foods, Inc. v. County of Aitkin, 266 N.W.2d 704, 705
(Minn. 1978).
259. See Wilson v. Ramacher, 352 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. 1984); Bridgeman-Russell
Co. v. City of Duluth, 158 Minn. 509, 510, 512,197 N.W. 971, 972 (1924) (overruling of demurrer to complaint upheld on appeal where municipality was sued for
property damages caused by water escaping through 20-inch water main which extended through center of city).
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dictions where the released substance was hazardous and
caused injury.26o
Other than in these few cases, trespass has rarely been used
as a cause of action for property damage caused by pollutants 261 due to a number of obstacles to recovery encountered
with this cause of action. 262 In practice many courts treat the
trespass cause of action as either negligence or strict liability,263 thus exposing plaintiffs to the limitations of those causes
of action. 264 In addition, while a defendant may be able to
claim contribution from a co-trespasser,265 such co-trespassers
would often not include generators of hazardous substances
due to the fact that the generators' acts would be too remote
from the actual trespass. 266 Finally, while the Minnesota statute of limitations for trespass is six years,267 judging from the
language of the statute, it probably begins to run when the acts
constituting the trespass occur rather than upon discovery of
the trespass. 268
b.

Nuisance

A nuisance is an unreasonable interference with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of his property.269 The elements of
nuisance are threefold: (1) significant harm must result from
260. See, e.g., Curry Coal Co. v. Aroni Co., 439 Pa. 114,266 A.2d 678 (1970) (permitting plaintiff to recover in trespass when chemical sludge from defendant's dumpsite flowed into plaintiff's coal mine); Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Or. 86, 342
P.2d 790 (1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960) (allowing action in trespass for escaping fluoride which entered plaintiff's property resulting in cattle deaths and property loss).
261. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at I-I.
262. See infra notes 267-72 and accompanying text.
263. See 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 2, at 1-3.
264. See infra text accompanying notes 273-99.
265. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 165.
266. See Curry Coal, 439 Pa. 114, 266 A.2d 678; Phillips v. Sun Oil Co., 307 N.Y.
328, 121 N.E.2d 249 (1954); Thompson v. Board ofEduc., 124 Misc. 840, 207 W. Va.
Supp. 362 (1939).
267. See MINN. STAT. § 541.05(3) (1984).
268. See id.
269. MINN. STAT. § 561.01 defines as a nuisance:
Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent or offensive to the senses,
or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the
comfortable enjoyment oflife or property, is a nuisance. An action may be
brought by any person whose property is injuriously affected or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance, and by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or abated, as well as damages recovered.
[d. § 561.01 (1984).
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an invasion of the plaintiffs legal interest in preserving his
health and free use of his property; (2) the defendant's conduct
must be the cause of the plaintiffs injury; and (3) the invasion
of the plaintiffs rights must be intentional and unreasonable
or unintentional and otherwise actionable. 270 The maintenance of a contaminated hazardous waste site may fit the description of a nuisance because the threat of personal
discomfort or disease interferes with use and enjoyment of
property.271 It has been held that contamination of groundwater used for industrial purposes is a nuisance. 272 The Minnesota Supreme Court has also held that the drainage of
creamery and other wastes onto another's land is a nuisance. 273
This cause of action, however, has several limitations.
Only persons with an interest in real property can recover
except in those very limited circumstances in which a private
party can sue for a public nuisance. The resolution of nuisance
cases requires a balancing of the equities: a weighing of the
plaintiff's interest against the social and economic utility of the
defendant's activities that cause the interference. The production of goods or services which generate hazardous wastes may
or may not be socially desirable. In some cases, those goods or
services meet a substantial need, and the interference with a
plaintiff's use and enjoyment of property caused by the resulting hazardous wastes may not be considered unreasonable,
thus adding to the difficulty of a nuisance claim. 274 The very
substantial and growing concern about hazardous substances
and the growing belief that land disposal of these substances
may be unnecessary, however, could mean that a hazardous
waste disposal site may not be considered as having a very high
utility. When balanced against the interference with a plaintiffs interest, particularly his interest in protecting his health,
hazardous substance disposal could be considered a nuisance.
In Minnesota, defendants causing an indivisible injury
through their negligence are jointly and severally liable for the
270. See Randall v. City of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 103 N.W.2d 131 (1960).
271. See 30I(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 90; see Highview N. Apartments v.
County of Ramsey, 323 N.W.2d 65,71 (Minn. 1982).
272. See Berger v. Minneapolis Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296,62 N.W. 336 (1895).
273. See Herrmann v. Larson, 214 Minn. 46, 7 N.W.2d 330 (1943).
274. 301 (e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 106.
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entire award, even if they did not act in concert. 275 Thus, if
several generators independently dispose of hazardous substances at a single site, causing a single indivisible injury, liability for resulting injuries would be joint and several.
c.

Negligence

A cause of action for negligence could arise out of the improper disposal of hazardous wastes, improper transportation
of such wastes, negligent spills, the negligent causation of hazardous waste surface runoff, or the negligent contamination of
subsurface water. Negligence, however, deals with conduct,
not with conditions. The defendant must be at fault, that is,
charged with having done some act or failing to do some act
which he had a duty to undertake, in a manner which violates a
standard of care. 276
The use of negligence as a cause of action may be difficult
where the improper act of disposal took place many years ago,
because evidence may be difficult to produce. It may be difficult to prove that there was a known risk and that the disposer
was aware of the risk. In order to demonstrate proximate
cause, the plaintiff will have to produce evidence of a faulty
instrumentality or an inadequate method of disposal, and evidence of a defendant's control of the instrumentality or
method employed. 277
d.

Common Law Strict Liability

When using a strict liability cause of action, a plaintiff will
have to demonstrate something inherent in the nature of the
defendant's injury-producing activity that justifies the placement of liability without fault upon the defendant for damages
caused by the activity. There are differing standards as to what
characteristics make an activity a candidate for strict liability.
These standards include a non-natural use of land, an ultrahazardous activity, an abnormally dangerous activity, and
strict products liability. Indeed, it is probably more accurate to
view the various liability tests as separate theories of liability.
Strict liability for a non-natural use of land found its begin275. Ruberg v. Skelly Oil Co., 297 N.W.2d 746, 752 (Minn. 1980); Matthews v.
Mills, 288 Minn. 16,22-23, 178 N.W.2d 841,845-46 (1970).
276. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 97.
277. Id. at 99.
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nings in the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher. 278 Under this
principle, courts determine whether an activity is "natural" by
considering its appropriateness in its location. 279 Specific criteria that courts look to are the character of the thing or activity, the place and manner in which it is maintained, and its
relation to its surroundings. 28o The doctrine of strict liability
for engaging in an ultrahazardous activity is taken from section
520 of the first Restatement of Torts. 281 The standard of "abnormally dangerous" is taken from sections 519 and 520 of the
Second Restatement of Torts 282 and strict products liability
theory is founded on section 402A.283
The Rylands v. Fletcher test and the "abnormally dangerous"
test of the Second Restatement are both balancing tests. They
consider the appropriateness of the activity in the particular
surroundings and involve a weighing of competing interests. 284
The "ultrahazardous activity" test, however, does not balance
opposing interests; it focuses mainly on the inherent dangerousness of the activity itself. 285 Multifactor balancing tests like
those of Rylands and section 520 of the Second Restatement
encourage courts to approach the question of strict liability on
a case-by-case basis, thereby complicating and prolonging litigation. The use of balancing also encourages courts to inject
notions of due care or fault into the analysis, making strict liability seem more like negligence. This mode of analysis subjects strict liability plaintiffs to the same types of problems
encountered by negligence plaintiffs. 286 Thus, the "ultrahazardous activity" test is the test most favorable to toxic
tort plaintiffs.
The difficulty of showing that anyone activity is abnormally
dangerous was shown in the case of Ferguson v. Northern States
Power CO.287 In Ferguson, the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to hold that the transmission of high-voltage electricity
278. 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, 1 L.R.-Ex. 265 (1866), ajJ'd, 3 L.R.-E. & I.
App. 330 (1869).
279. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 114.
280. Id. at 115.
281. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 520 (1938).
282. RESTATEMENT, supra note 79, § 520.
283. Id. § 402A.
284. 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. I, at 115, 119.
285. /d. at 116-17.
286. /d. at 120-21.
287. 307 Minn. 26, 239 N.W.2d 190 (1976).
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was an abnormally dangerous activity, even though recognizing that the activity was highly dangerous and presented the
risk of unusually serious harm. 288 The court was persuaded by
the severe economic consequences which could be sustained
by small electric utilities through the imposition of strict liability.289 Like the transmission of electricity, the generation,
transportation, and disposal of hazardous substances presents
danger and the risk of serious harm. Imposing strict liability
on generators, transporters, and disposers could subject such
actors to severe economic consequences, like bankruptcy, due
to the possibiity of high damage awards. Thus, the Minnesota
Supreme Court may refuse to impose strict liability for the
same reasons mentioned in Ferguson.
Quite recently, in a somewhat similar case, the court refused
to impose strict liability on a natural gas company for damages
resulting from a leak in a gas main located in a public street
and a consequent explosion. The court recognized that the
risk from escaping natural gas is great and that this risk is
highly dangerous to persons and property. The court nevertheless refused to impose strict liability, primarily because the
gas lines were not under the exclusive control of the gas
company.290
Personal injury caused by exposure to a hazardous substance
in a defective consumer product would presumably be the basis for a traditional section 402A products liability claim. 291
However, injury caused by release of such a substance from a
hazardous waste site is unlikely to fit within the products liability theory. A person injured in this way is not a product user
or consumer and the manufacturer or seller of the hazardous
substance could not generally anticipate such harm from the
manufacture or sale of his product. This would be particularly
true where, as would often be the case, the product undergoes
substantial change by the time it is disposed of as waste.
It is not at all clear which, if any, of the strict liability theories
the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted. The court specifi288. [d. at 31-32, 239 N.W.2d at 193-94.
289. See id.
290. Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856 (Minn. 1984). For a discussion of Mahowald, see II WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 599 (1985).
291. See McCormack v. Hankscraft, 278 Minn. 327,154 N.W.2d488 (1967); see also
Steenson, The Anatomy of Products Liability in Minnesota: The Theories of Recovery, 6 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. I (1980).
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cally mentioned the "abnormally dangerous" test to the exclusion of the other tests in three recent cases 292 and has
discussed and analyzed the "ultrahazardous" test only once. 293
In its most recent discussion of strict liability theory, however,
the court appeared to reject the "abnormally dangerous"
test. 294 In response to plaintiffs argument for application of
that test, the court concluded that "our attention [has not]
been directed to any. . . case where we did apply" the abnormally dangerous test. 295 The court discussed but did not apply
the Rylands v. Fletcher test. 296
In the first case tried in which claims based on MERLA
arose, however, the district court found as a matter of law that
both the Rylands v. Fletcher and abnormally dangerous activity
theories were applicable. 297 The court also considered, but
did not submit to the jury, an "environmental tort" theory of
liability: a doctrine imposing strict liability for injury or harm
resulting from the manufacture, storage, or disposal of hazardous or toxic chemical wastes. Though this case did not involve
any personal injury claims, the court's rationale, set out in a
lengthy and thorough set of findings, conclusions, and a memorandum, would apply as readily in such a case. 29B
The apparent confusion on the part of the Minnesota
Supreme Court as to the circumstances giving rise to strict liability makes the availability of any of these common law causes
of action to toxic substance victims rather speculative. Of
course, MERLA establishes strict liability as the basis of its
cause of action but in cases where MERLA does not apply, the
availability of strict liability as a matter of common law is an
open question. Section 115B.06 of MERLA, which amounts to
a limitation on MERLA's strict liability cause of action, provides that if the defendant can show that the plaintiffs damages were caused by the release of a hazardous substance that
was placed in a facility "wholly before January 1, 1973," it is a
292. See Seim v. Garavalia. 306 N.W.2d 806 (Minn. 1981); Armstrong v. Mailand.
284 N.W.2d 343 (Minn. 1979); Ferguson v. Northern States Power Co .• 307 Minn.
26.31-32.239 N.W.2d 190. 194 (1976).
293. See Cairl v. City of St. Paul. 268 N.W.2d 908 (Minn. 1978).
294. Mahowald, 344 N.W.2d 856.
295. Id. at 861.
296. Ill.
297. See State ex rei Boise Cascade Corp. v. Onan Corp., No. B-46882, Anoka
County Dist. Ct. (Hon. Daniel M. Kammeyer).
298. See ill.

HeinOnline -- 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 718 1985

1985]

HAZARDOUS WASTES

719

defense to liability under section 115B.05 that the activity by
which the hazardous substance came to be located in the place
from which it was released "was not an abnormally dangerous
activity." This language suggests that the legislature believes
that the proper test for strict liability arising, not under
MERLA's provision (§ 115B.05) but as a matter of common
law, is the abnormally dangerous test from section 520 of the
Second Restatement of Torts. On the other hand, this language in section 115B.06(2) may be viewed as a separate statutory cause of action for injuries caused by a certain category of
hazardous substance releases (those occurring wholly before
January 1, 1973) which incorporates the abnormally dangerous
standard and leaves to the court the determination of whether
the activity giving rise to injury in the case at hand was abnormally dangerous. Many hazardous substance releases seem
more like the classic Rylands case of escape of a dangerous instrumentality than does transmission of electricity, which was
the act involved in Ferguson. Perhaps this greater similarity
could persuade the Minnesota Supreme Court to make that
strict liability cause of action available as a matter of common
law in circumstances where the MERLA cause of action is not
available. Finally, the environmental tort theory of liability
recognized by one district court could be adopted by the
Supreme, Court as well.
4.

Non-law Remedies: Insurance

A non-law remedy worth brief mention is the availability of
insurance coverage for injury and damages occurring as a result of hazardous substance exposure. This coverage basically
falls into two categories, direct and indirect coverage. Direct
coverage refers to the situation in which the injured or damaged party is the named insured beneficiary of some insurance
policy. This policy may be private insurance provided by the
injured party himself, his family or his employer, or may be
public insurance such as Social Security Disability or Medicare
or Medicaid coverage. A person insured in this way may be
compensated for personal injuries suffered as a result of exposure to hazardous substances up to the limits of the policy's
coverage. Indirect insurance refers to the situation in which
the party causing the injury is insured and the person suffering
the injury obtains some right or agreement to compensation
from the insured party, which compensation is then paid by the
HeinOnline -- 11 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 719 1985
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insurer. 299
Regardless of the source of insurance coverage, for those
persons injured or suffering damage as a result of exposure to
hazardous substances there will be many variations in the availability of insurance coverage. Even for those that are insured,
there are many variations in the extent of insurance coverage
both with respect to the types of injuries or damages covered
and dollar limitations in the forms of deductible amounts or
maximum liability limits in the insurance policy. Even for
those persons who may be covered for health effects damages
resulting from hazardous substance exposure, there is little
likelihood that their insurance would cover property damage
problems such as the provision of a new drinking water supply.
It is perhaps effectively impossible to determine precisely
which Minnesotans are covered by insurance of some kind
either directly or indirectly and, if covered, what compensation
limitations that insurance coverage may entail. A recent study
indicates that between eight and nine percent of adult Americans are uninsured. 30o It is certain, however, that the many
variations in both the availability and extent of insurance coverage do not represent an effective existing compensation
mechanism for a person suffering personal injury or other
losses due to exposure to hazardous substances.

C.

Summary

The common law remedies that predated the passage of
MERLA in 1983 are collectively an inefficient and ineffective
mechanism for responding to injuries and losses occurring as a
result of exposure to hazardous substances. The problems
with these causes of action make recovery for toxics-injured
victims especially difficult. Some of these common law theories may not even be available to a toxics-injured victim. Indeed, the creation of a statutory strict liability cause of action
in MERLA is a legislative confirmation of the inadequacies of
common law rights and remedies.
Implied private rights of action under the various federal
hazardous substance regulatory programs are very unlikely to
be available in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent analysis and conclusions on the implied rights question.
299. See supra text accompanying notes 177-91.
300. National Underwriter, Dec. 30, 1983, at 18, col. 1.
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No existing statutory remedies, except section 115B.05 of
MERLA, are designed to respond to the personal injury
problem.
Private and public insurance are no guarantee of adequate
compensation, especially for the most needy who are least able
to afford health and life insurance.
MERLA's strict liability cause of action was created essentially as a response to these inadequacies. MERLA's response
is clearly a step in the right direction. By making it clear that
liability is strict, the large and potentially insurmountable hurdle of having to show a defendant's fault, especially for past
actions where evidence of the defendant's conduct may no
longer exist and the applicable standard of care may have been
much lower than it would now be, is eliminated. The causation
provision demonstrates the legislature's concern about this difficult barrier to recovery for injured persons but the provision
is unlikely to alleviate that problem.
Even under MERLA, however, a number of potential
problems for the victims of hazardous substance exposure remain. To begin with, not all toxic and hazardous substances
which might cause human injury are covered by MERLA nor
are all releases of those substances subject to MERLA's liability provisions. Not all damages which may result from hazardous substance exposure may be recoverable under MERLA
because of the limits on joint and several and retroactive liability. There may be a cap on recovery of damages, such as the
liability limit of political subdivisions or the liability limit for
any jointly liable defendant who can apportion his liability
under the Comparative Fault Act. A further important limitation is the retroactivity limit in MERLA. For releases occurring
wholly before July 1, 1983, or deposits wholly before 1960,
MERLA's strict liability is not available. These limitations may
be perfectly sensible for private lawsuit purposes. Indeed, they
are in the Act as the result of a considerable amount of legislative consideration. But they restrict the availability of full compensation for all victims.
More importantly, while MERLA may somewhat reduce the
single most substantial hurdle faced by victims of hazardous
substance exposure-to prove, in a costly and complicated
lawsuit, the specific cause of their injury-proof of causation
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remains a substantial hurdle. The substantial costs oflitigation
remain unchanged by the creation of MER LA's cause of action.
When all available legal remedies are assessed, it is clear that
a person injured by exposure to a hazardous substance can, for
many reasons, be barred from access to any of those remedies.
No non-legal compensation mechanism reliably fills the gap
represented by those who remain uncompensated or undercompensated. One must therefore conclude that existing
remedies and compensation systems are inadequate and, when
combined with the potential number of persons who may be
injured in this way, further conclude that something needs to
be done as a matter of sound public policy.
III.

A

VICTIM COMPENSATION PROGRAM FOR MINNESOTA

All of the significant studies 301 which have addressed the
problem of personal injury due to hazardous substance exposure have reached essentially the same conclusion: present
laws and other compensation mechanisms are an inadequate
response to personal injuries in the hazardous substances context. Of course, the only study that specifically addresses the
problem of compensating personal injury victims of hazardous
substance exposure in Minnesota is the LCWM's 1984 Study.
After assessing the need for compensation and available
mechanisms, including tort claims, for providing such compensation, the Study concludes that persons injured by exposure
to hazardous substances may, for a number of reasons, not be
compensated fully or at all for their injuries. 302 With respect to
the issue of creating some kind of administrative victim compensation fund system, the Study concludes that in light of the
assessed needs and the many other important problems currently before the legislature, no victim compensation fund
should now be established. 303 However, in anticipation that
new information or changed legislative priorities may lead to
the creation of such a system, the Study analyzes a whole series
of issues that arise in structuring and financing such a fund and
301. See, e.g., 301 (e)

supra note 4; Trauberman, supra note 9; LEGISLATIVE
A STUDY OF COMPENSATION FOR VICTIMS OF
SUBSTANCE EXPOSURE (P. Hamilton &J.D. Prince 1984) [hereinafter cited
REPORT,

COMMISSION ON WASTE MANAGEMENT,
HAZARDOUS

as

LCWM STUDY).

302. See LCWM STUDY, supra note 301, pt. III, at 90.
303. See gtmerally id. at 162.
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makes recommendations to the legislature respecting such issues. 304 This section summarizes the LCWM recommendations and focuses briefly on some of them.
A.

The LCWM Recommendations

The LCWM Study recommends that, if a state fund is established, it be administered by an appointed, three-member
board housed in or identical with the existing Crime Victims
Reparation Board, the name of which would be changed to the
Victims Compensation Board. The full board would hear and
decide each claim. It would be authorized to advertise or
otherwise notify potential claimants of their option of claiming
against the fund. 305
All parties affected by covered diseases and injuries would
be eligible to file a claim, subject to a time limitation of a few
years between the date of filing and the date the injury could
reasonably have been tied to the exposure. Covered diseases
and injuries would not include those arising as a result of
workplace and consumer product exposures, but otherwise
there would be no restrictions placed on eligibility to claim.
Injured parties could either make a claim to the fund or pursue
existing tort remedies. Use of one system would not prevent
access to the other, but double recovery would be prohibited.
The information required in the claim would include proof
of exposure to a hazardous substance, proof of a covered injury or disease which has resulted in economic loss, and proof
that it is more likely than not that the exposure caused or significantly contributed to the disease or injury.
Compensation to injured parties would include eighty to
ninety percent of all medical expenses up to a predetermined
level, and 100% of all medical expenses thereafter. 306 Compensation would include lost wages, lost household labor, and
lost profits, the sum of which could not exceed a fixed percentage of the average wages in the county where the injury arose.
This compensation would also apply if the injured party died,
except it would be paid to dependents in the amounts they
would receive as dependents after the decedent's consumption
was subtracted. Property damages would be covered in full, if
304. See id. at 106-60.
305. See id. at 162.
306. /d. at 163.
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they were not otherwise compensated by other sources. Pain
and suffering and other non-pecuniary losses would not be
covered.
An overall ceiling of $250,000 is recommended to avoid
bankrupting the fund and to encourage the use of the tort system for very large damages. To lower the burden on the fund,
a small minimum claim amount is also recommended, and any
collateral sources of funds such as insurance would also be
deducted.
Appeal would be allowed only if constitutional rights require
it. This prevents duplicative transaction costs and decisions by
a judge less informed and skilled on the issues than the Board.
Finally, the Study recommends that the fund should be financed by general revenues "to avoid placing an additional
burden on Minnesota businesses at a time when efforts are being made to improve the state's business climate."307 Whenever a claim was paid, a right of subrogation would be acquired
by the fund. The Study recommends that this subrogation
right be used whenever cost effective in large claims or particularly egregious actions.
In light of the concerns raised earlier about the existing system for compensation, a few of these recommendations call for
comment.
B.

Claimant Eligibility

The LCWM Study discusses various approaches to the coverage issue, including limiting eligibility to victims of "orphan"
sites (for which no responsible party now exists) or insolvent
defendants (determined only after a judgment is obtained in a
lawsuit but cannot be wholly satisfied). It concludes that all
injured parties should be allowed to make claims regardless of
whether they could be compensated under the tort system, but
that the fund would not cover "diseases or injuries that result
from workplace exposure or exposure to a consumer prodUCt."308 While it would be fairly easy to distinguish workplace
injuries simply by reference to workers' compensation law, determining which injuries are due to "exposure to a consumer
product" would not be so easy.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 126.
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A determination that an injury was not workplace-related
can be made under the existing body of workers' compensation law on that issue. Whatever the decision, the injury would
either be covered by workers' compensation insurance or represent an eligible claim to the victims compensation fund.
Plaintiffs injured due to exposure to a consumer product
would not be eligible to claim against the fund, presumably
because of the view that consumer product liability law is adequately developed to respond to such injuries. 309 The Study
does not discuss how one is to determine whether such an injury is so caused. In some cases that determination might be
easy; in others it would not. For example, what about an injury
due to exposure to a product originally sold in the consumer
marketplace but found discarded in a landfill at the time of exposure? Is that an injury "due to exposure to a consumer
product"? The statutory provisions defining eligible claims
would need to address this issue specifically and with as much
clarity as possible.
C.

Access to Both Administrative Compensation and Tort Systems

The Study discusses the degree to which a new administrative compensation fund should complement or substitute for
the existing tort system. It discusses compulsory use of the
fund, an approach similar to that taken by a workers' compensation system for work-related injuries; binding election between a tort and an administrative claim, an approach in which
an injured party would choose one system or the other and be
bound by that choice; and finally recommends access to both
systems with provisions to prevent double recovery.310 This is
essentially the approach recommended by the 301(e) Report
and has the same faults.
The essential argument for this approach is that it would allow needy claimants to seek immediate compensation from the
fund without giving up their "rights" to later seek a larger recovery in a tort action. One disadvantage to this scheme is that
the fund recovery can be used to finance a tort suit that might
otherwise not be brought. If the purpose of the fund award is
to make the injured cl~imant whole, it should not be used to
309. Cf. Trauberman, supra note 9, at 221 (Model Statute focuses coverage on injuries least adequately covered by traditional tort and compensation systems).
310. See LCWM STUDY, supra note 301, pt. III, at 127.
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gamble on a tort recovery. More importantly, in light of the
earlier discussion of the very high transaction costs associated
with tort litigation, this scheme could result in duplicative
transaction costs. The claimant cannot recover twice, and if
first the fund is used and then a tort suit is commenced, the
costs of making the compensation transaction become unacceptably high.
It would be much better to adopt either a binding election or
compulsory use of the fund approach. The choice between
these two approaches depends on a number of factors including the compensation limits set on awards from the fund, the
source of financing for the fund, and one's views about the appropriate balance between full compensation and efficiency in
the compensation system. 311
Requiring compulsory use of the administrative compensation remedy would preclude use of the existing tort system altogether. This approach has some attractive aspects.
Compulsory use of the fund would create the largest reduction
in evidentiary costs and free the judicial system from potential
overloading and congestion. 312 It would also diminish the possibility that toxic tort defendants would incur crippling financial losses from many damage awards. Understandably, this
approach is favored by the defense bar. 313 So long as compensation limits are not set too low, claimants would be adequately
compensated and the social costs of compensation would be
greatly reduced.
Eliminating the tort system, however, overlooks some worthwhile benefits of that system. A tort system remedy may allow
plaintiffs the opportunity to receive larger measures of damages, such as pain and suffering, that an administrative system
may not provide. 314 Tort suits also assess liability in direct relationship to responsibility for injury and, though there is no
good evidence that they do, are alleged to encourage reasonable care and discourage carelessness. 315 Finally, with respect
311. See id.
312. See id. at 129; 301(e) REPORT, supra note 4, pt. 1, at 185.
313. LCWM STUDY, supra note 301, at 129 (footnote omitted) (citing
HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT COUNCIL, STATUTORY AND COMMON
REPORT,
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to actually legislating such a system into existence, foreclosure
of access to the tort system would likely generate heated opposition from the plaintiffs bar.
By requiring a toxic tort victim to make a binding election
between tort and administrative remedies, the claimant must
choose one system and is then foreclosed from later using the
other. This approach has some advantages. First, it retains the
existing tort system for those who cannot bear to see it go. If
the fund is designed so as to provide adequate compensation,
victims would generally be satisfied with their recoveries and
feel no need to go to the tort system. Second, it avoids the
duplication of costs problem raised by the approach recommended in the Study.316
If the fund is financed wholly or largely by special revenues
generated by taxing the hazardous substance industry, binding
election is the worst of all possible worlds to defendants. They
would not only pay to finance the fund's payment of most
claims but would obtain no protection from the extraordinarily
large claims which are likely to be made the subject of a tort
suit. Furthermore, if the primary goal of the fund is to provide
adequate compensation to victims at the lowest social cost,
there is no need to offer plaintiffs the option of tort actions and
their attendant high costs in adition to to a well-designed
fund. 317
D.

The Decisionmaking Process

The Study proposes a claim decisionmaking process that is
essentially non-adversarial in nature by arguing that there is no
sense in shifting the problems associated with the adversarial,
private tort law claim resolution process into an administrative
context. The decisionmaking board should act not so much as
a defendant but rather as a neutral, expert decisionmaker with
respect to these claims. In keeping with this concept, the system should avoid the need for expensive evidence gathering
and presentation, and lengthy oral proceedings. The criteria
established for compensation must be designed to facilitate the
compensation of orily meritorious claims. To serve this goal,
the Study recommends the adoption of thresholds which, if
316. LCWM

STUDY,

supra note 301, pt. III, at 129.

317. [d. at 130.
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satisfied, would result in a decision to compensate. 1H8
The thresholds which the claimant's information and evidence must satisfy in order to be compensated are: (1) the
claimant must suffer or have suffered death, injury or disease
which has caused a compensable loss (which would be defined
by statute); and (2) the claimant must have been exposed to a
hazardous substance in an amount and duration sufficient to
cause or significantly contribute to death or an injury or disease of the type suffered by the claimant. 1H9 If the board believes, on the basis of the information before it, that it is more
likely than not that each of these thresholds is satisfied, it
would compensate the claimant.
In many cases, the claim could be determined largely or
even exclusively on the basis of medical reports and other documentary evidence submitted by the claimant, as is generally
done in social security disability determinations. Some claims
could no doubt be made and decided without the assistance of
a lawyer. These features would tend to keep down the costs of
the compensation transaction. As final emphasis to the lowcost, non-adversarial theme, the Study recommends a limita ton on appeals of awards made by the fund since appeals
interfere with prompt final resolution and should therefore be
allowed only when necessary to ensure constitutional
fairness. 32o
The requisite fairness would be satisfied by observance of
constitutional due process requirements. The administrative
board would be bound to fully compensate victims, within the
compensation limits, and the collegial nature of the decisionmaking process would ensure that no one individual's mistakes
will adversely affect claimants.
Many seem to feel that the more often the same matter is
decided, the more likely it is that the last decision on the matter will be correct. This belief may be based on a perception
that a fact or opinion on some matter exists independently of
some human decisionmaker's perception. But that is obviously
not the case. There is no reason to think that a judge'S decision on a compensation matter is any more likely to be correct
than the administrative expert's initial determination on the
318. /d. at 134.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 163.
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same matter (assuming both have access to the same information). Indeed, there is better reason to think that the judge
and his decision on appeal may be wrong and the initial expert
decision right in these circumstances. Of course, one must assume that the decisionmaking process is fair. Adherence to
constitutional due process requirements assures that fairness.
Such constitutional issues should therefore be appealable. On
all other issues appeal should be precluded. 321
E.

Compensating Property and Non-Pecuniary Losses

The Study recommends compensation subject to some ceilings; co-insurance payment requirements of ten to twenty percent to stimulate the patient's interest in reducing health care
costs; and collateral source deductions of medical expenses,
lost income, and death benefits. All of these make perfect
sense in an administrative system designed to compensate personal injury victims. However, it also recommends compensation for property damages and it recommends against
compensation for pain and suffering and other non-pecuniary
losses.
While there is no question that one may suffer property
damage as well as personal injury due to hazardous substance
exposure, any administrative scheme designed to respond to
the personal injury compensation problem ought to deal exclusively with that problem. While in theory it is as important
to compensate for property injuries as for personal injuries,
there are important practical reasons for limiting compensation from the fund to personal injuries. Very simply, payment
for property losses could bankrupt or seriously dilute the resources of the fund so that it would not be possible to respond
adequately to personal injury claims. 322 Further, Minnesota already has a property damages fund of sorts in MELRA, the
state superfund. If more extensive property loss compensation
is needed, it makes more sense to expand the superfund rather
than to cover such losses in a new fund designed principally to
aid personal injury victims.
Neither the LCWM nor any of the other major studies recommend inclusion of pain and suffering as an element of com321. [d. at 148-50.
322. [d. at 163.
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pensation in an administrative scheme. 323 Pain and suffering
compensation is an integral part of the tort system and many
attorneys feel that such awards are essential to making the injured party whole. This is particularly true when pain and suffering is large and the pecuniary award is small. However,
many arguments can be raised against allowing damages for
pain and suffering. Parties have differing pain thresholds and
pain and suffering is difficult to quantify. It is an element of
compensation in which awards typically vary a great deal. Furthermore, individuals generally do not insure themselves
against pain and suffering. 324 Because such damages are so
speculative and decisionmakers so susceptible to emotional influence on the issue, neither pain and suffering nor other nonpecuniary losses, such as fear and trauma, should be compensated by an administrative fund.
F.

Fund Subrogation Rights

The Study points out that the question of whether the fund
should obtain, upon payment of compensation to a victim, a
subrogation right to pursue a recovery against the injury-causing party is a complex one that is closely tied to the source of
fund financing. 325 Ifa victim compensation fund were financed
exclusively by special revenues derived in appropriate proportions from all whose actions contribute to hazardous substance
personal injuries, then rights of subrogation and actions based
on those rights against injury-causing parties are inappropriate
because those parties are already paying for the costs of their
activities. Furthermore, they already have the economic incentive to reduce the risk posed by their activities because doing
so will reduce their taxes. Subrogation actions in these circumstances result in making parties against whom such claims are
successful pay twice and, in theory, generate more revenues
than needed by the fund. Another disadvantage of subrogation rights is that they create the prospect of litigation and all
of its problems that the fund is designed to avoid.
Because the Study recommends general revenue financing
exclusively, it recommends that the fund obtain subrogation
323. Id. at 142.
324. See id.
325. See id. at 156.
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rights to be exercised at the discretion of the board. 326 Subrogation rights are most likely to be pursued where the recovery
from the fund has been relatively large, so that the costs of
pursuing the claim are more likely to be outweighed by the
recovery, or where the injury-causing act has been particularly
egregious rather than purely accidental. Successful use of this
right will help avoid depletion of the fund's resources, though
subrogation recoveries are unlikely to represent a very significant portion of the fund. Furthermore, if only large claims are
pursued, the number of subrogation actions is unlikely to be
large so the goal of avoiding· the costs of private tort actions is
not signficantly compromised. 327
CONCLUSION

The problem of assuring adequate compensation to those
injured as a result of exposure to hazardous substances has
been and continues to be a matter of much debate. The legislature has shown a continuing interest in this problem and has
responded by creating a statutory cause of action in MERLA.
The limitations of that remedy combined with the limitations
associated with other existing remedies justify serious consideration of an administrative compensation program. The
LCWM Study represents the most current examination of the
complex and interrelated issues raised by the prospect of an
administrative compensation program. While the LCWM recommendations are generally sensible, some are inconsistent
with the goal of a fair and efficient personal injury compensation program. These faults can, however, be cured in the creation of any legislation which may result from that Study.
326. See id. at 163.
327. See id. at 156-57.
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